Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued law enforcement officers for excess use of force, assault and battery, and unlawful entry after the officers breached the locked door to the private bedroom of plaintiffs' 27-year-old son, Scott, to arrest him for threatening his mother. Scott attacked the officers with two knives, and in the ensuing melee, the officers shot and killed him. The court held that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. Because the court held that Scott's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force was not violated, the court need not consider the issue of whether that right was clearly established. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of official immunity to the officers on plaintiffs' assault-and-battery claims; unlawful-entry claims; and warrantless arrest claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all claims.

This appeal arose out of the trial of Telandra Jones, Theddis Pearson, and five other defendants for Medicare fraud and related crimes stemming from the practices of their business, Statewide Physical Medicine Group. Defendants used unauthorized personnel to perform physical rehabilitation on Medicare patients and then billed Medicare at an inflated rate for those treatments. Because the court found that the verdict form used by the district court lowered the level of mens rea required to convict Pearson of health care false statements, the court reversed his convictions on those counts. On all other claims raised by defendants, the court found no reversible error and therefore affirmed Jones' and Pearson's convictions for theft of government funds and money laundering.

Brian and Debra Spurlin were convicted of concealment of bankruptcy estate assets, for knowingly and fraudulently withholding their interests in certain properties from their bankruptcy filings, and false oaths and statements in bankruptcy for a false answer they gave on a bankruptcy questionnaire. Mr. Spurlin was also convicted of bankruptcy fraud for filing bankruptcy to effect and conceal a fraudulent scheme whereby he took money he was supposedly holding in escrow for a company with whom he was doing business. Mr. Spurlin did not appeal his conviction of concealment, but the Spurlins appealed all other convictions. The court affirmed the conviction of Mrs. Spurlin on all counts; affirmed Mr. Spurlin's convictions of concealment of bankruptcy estate assets and of bankruptcy fraud; but reversed Mr. Spurlin's conviction of false oaths and statements in bankruptcy for insufficient evidence. Accordingly, the court vacated Mr. Spurlin's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal from the United States. Defendant had a conviction of manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of section 11379.6 of the California Health and Safety Code. Because the district court classified that conviction as a "drug trafficking offense," the sentence was enhanced by sixteen levels under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. On appeal, defendant contested the classification of the prior conviction. Because the court did not read "manufacture" broadly for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, there were some acts that would violate section 11379.6 without qualifying as a "drug trafficking offense" for purposes of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement.

Defendant was convicted of knowing possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had knowledge that the 112 digital pornographic images were in the computers at issue; or possession of the images, that is, the power and ability to access and exercise dominion or control over them. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction.

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to 25 years in prison, based in part on his two prior felony convictions. Defendant appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition as time-barred. Because the court concluded that defendant did not waive his right to direct appeal and as a result, his habeas petition was timely under section 2254, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for the district court to consider defendant's habeas petition on the merits.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography and was sentenced to 220 months imprisonment, as well as a 25 year term of supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence and elements of his supervised release. The court held that the sentence imposed was not unreasonable and affirmed the conditions of supervised release.

Defendant was convicted of using a communication facility to facilitate a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence, claiming that the search and seizure of her cell phone was tainted by law enforcement officers' illegal entry into a home where she was a guest. The court concluded that the officers' entry was justified by exigent circumstances, that the search and seizure of defendant's cell phone occurred under the authority of a valid warrant, and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft of mail matter by a postal service employee for stealing gift cards. On appeal, defendant argued that the use of pre-arrest, pre-Mirandized silences were impermissible. The court held that, even though the prosecution's closing argument mentioned defendant's refusal to speak to a special agent, the admission of the silence was still harmless where the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty even without admission of defendant's silence. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This insurance coverage case arose out of an underlying personal injury lawsuit brought by Michael Parr against Gilbane Building Company. Gilbane, a general contractor, sought defense and indemnification from Admiral Insurance Company based on an insurance policy held by Empire Steel Erectors, a subcontractor. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that Admiral owed a duty to defend and indemnify. As a preliminary matter, the court held that Gilbane qualified as an additional insured. The court held that, pursuant to the strict eight-corners rule, Admiral had no duty to defend where the petition did not affirmatively allege any facts implicating the negligence of either Empire or Parr. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Gilbane on the duty to defend. The court held, however, that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Admiral owed Gilbane a duty to indemnify for the cost of its settlement with Parr and the district court's summary judgment on that matter was affirmed.