Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from SL Management's Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition where Texas Capital appeared as a creditor in SL Management's bankruptcy suit. During the pendency of SL Management's bankruptcy case, Texas Capital filed an action in Texas state court to enforce guarantee agreements between it and plaintiff, a member of SL Management. The Texas state court entered a default judgment against plaintiff and Texas Capital initiated collection proceedings against plaintiff in Louisiana state court and registered the Texas judgment. In response to the collection action, plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a declaration that SL Management's debt to Texas Capital was fully satisfied by the surrender of collateral. The court subsequently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was not implicated and proceeded to consider whether plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief was barred by res judicata. The court held that res judicata barred the assertion of plaintiff's claims for declaratory judgment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and rendered judgment in favor of Texas Capital.

Spencer Committee appealed two orders of the district court: (1) the denial of the Spencer Committee's appeal of the bankruptcy court's confirmation order of the reorganization plan (Plan) by Idearc on the grounds of equitable mootness and (2) denial of the Spencer Committee's motion for a trial de novo of its fraud claims. The court held that the Spencer Committee appeared before the bankruptcy court and did not obtain a stay; the Plan had been substantially consummated; and the Spencer Committee's requested relief would adversely impact the success of the Plan or the rights of third parties not before the court. Accordingly, on the grounds of equitable mootness, the court affirmed the district court's order granting Idearc's motion to dismiss the Spencer Committee's appeal of the Confirmation Order of the Plan.

In the Chapter 13 case of appellees, Countrywide sought the recovery of attorney's fees incurred in connection with the bankruptcy as well as a determination that compliance with Federal Bankruptcy Procedure 2016 was not necessary for the recovery of such fees. The bankruptcy court held that Countrywide was not entitled to recover its attorney's fees and determined that there was no justiciable issue to resolve regarding the applicability of Bankruptcy Rule 2016 because Countrywide had already complied with the rule. The district court affirmed. The court held that the bankruptcy court and district court misconstrued the provision of the contract governing the availability of attorney's fees and that Countrywide was entitled to recover the fees sought in its Fee Application. Like the bankruptcy and district courts, however, the court declined to address whether Bankruptcy Rule 2016 applied. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and one count of aggravated battery, and was sentenced to four concurrent terms of imprisonment. Subsequently, a life sentence on the first count of attempted first degree murder was imposed due to defendant's status as a habitual offender. Defendant's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and state habeas relief was denied. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising several grounds for relief, including a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied relief and the court granted a certificate of appealability as to defendant's double jeopardy claim only. The court held that the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision regarding defendant's double jeopardy claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. The decision also did not involve "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Accordingly, the district court properly denied defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the judgment was affirmed.

This appeal required the court to determine what effect, if any, a retiree benefits-related provision included in an asset purchase agreement had on the acquiring company's retiree benefits plans governed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1000 et seq. The court held that the provision constituted a valid plan amendment. Moreover, the court held that the provision was assumed, not rejected, in bankruptcy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs, Mr. and Ms. Jimenez, sued the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging constitutional violations stemming from their arrests. Ms. Jimenez claimed that, because she was arrested for a minor offense, she could be strip-searched only upon reasonable suspicion that she was concealing weapons or contraband. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Ms. Jimenez, the court entered a final judgment against the County, awarding Ms. Jimenez for past and future mental anguish, as well as punitive damages. The County appealed and a panel of the court affirmed. The court granted rehearing en banc and vacated the panel opinion. Because the County had not demonstrated reversible error in the jury instructions in this case, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court reinstated Parts III, IV, and V of the panel opinion, which rejected other arguments that the County had not urged on rehearing.

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely filed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). Petitioner argued that the court should treat his petition as having been timely filed because his prior unsuccessful effort to mail a habeas petition through his prison mail room, prior to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations, entitled him to the benefits of the mailbox rule or equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The court held that petitioner attempted to mail his petition in a manner consistent with the mail regulations, and that he was prevented from doing so because prison mail room officials wrongfully returned it for failure to comply with a nonexistent prison mail regulation. Accordingly, the court agreed that petitioner should have been afforded the benefit of the mailbox rule and that his petition should have been considered timely filed. Therefore, the court reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a group representing taxicab companies that hold only one to three permits for cabs, asserted that the city's plan to distribute new taxicab permits violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating taxi companies differently based on size and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 27 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release for illegal reentry after deportation. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the staleness of a prior conviction in the proper calculation of a guidelines-range sentence did not render a sentence substantively unreasonable and did not destroy the presumption of reasonableness that attached to such sentences. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred in failing to accord proper weight to his cultural assimilation.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of felony possession of a firearm. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed two petitions for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, which the district court consolidated, construed as a second or successive section 2255 motion and transferred to this court. Petitioner appealed the district court's order. Petitioner also filed a motion for a Certificate of Appealability or, in the alternative, a motion for authorization to file a successive section 2255 motion. After first determining sua sponte that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal, the court affirmed the district court's transfer order and denied the motion for authorization to file a successive section 2255 motion.