Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thomas E. Clemmons, the former director of operations for Ameristar Airways, Incorporated (Ameristar), filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging he was discharged in retaliation for reporting air safety issues to the Federal Aviation Administration. The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (Board) found a violation of the employee protection provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, ordering an award of back pay. The court held that because Clemmons had presented a prima facie case of retaliation and adduced evidence capable of rebutting Ameristar's proffered explanations, substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of liability. The court held, however, that because the question of whether Clemmons' insubordinate email, which was after-acquired evidence, "was of such severity that [he] would have been terminated on these grounds alone" was a question of fact, the court remanded to the agency to make that determination and to adjust the back pay award if necessary.

Plaintiffs challenged the district court's conclusion that they, as agents of Beacon Maritime, Inc. (Beacon), were bound by Beacon's agreement to arbitrate disputes with Aban Offshore Limited (Aban). The court held that under settled principles of agency and contract law, plaintiffs were not personally bound by Beacon's agreement with Aban and therefore, the court reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when an ocean-going tanker collided with a barge that was being towed on the Mississippi River, which resulted in the barge splitting in half and spilling its cargo of oil into the river. Following the filing of numerous lawsuits, including personal injury claims by the crew members and class actions by fishermen, the primary insurer filed an interpleader action, depositing its policy limits with the court. At issue was the allocations of the interpleader funds as well as the district court's finding that the maritime insurance policy's liability limit included defense costs. The court affirmed the district court's decision that defense costs eroded policy limits but was persuaded that its orders allocating court-held funds among claimants were tentative and produced no appealable order.

This bankruptcy appeal involved parties that have a business history extending from at least April 27, 2005 where appellee and the Secretary of Lothian Oil signed two agreements which would lead to proofs of claim 164 and 171. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court could recharacterize a claim as equity rather than debt. The court held that because Texas law would not have recognized appellee's claims as asserting a debt interest, the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed them as debt and recharacterized the claims as equity interests. Moreover, because insiders and non-insiders alike could mischaracterize their claims in contravention of state law, the court declined to limit recharacterization to insider claims. The court further held that the other assertions of error were without merit.

This case arose from an oil spill in the Mississippi River when an ocean-going tanker struck a barge that was being towed. Appellants (Excess Insurers) appealed the district court's decision requiring them to pay prejudgment interest on the funds deposited into the court's registry in an interpleader action. The Excess Insurers argued that the district court erred by: (1) finding that coverage under the excess policy was triggered by the primary insurer's filing of an interpleader complaint; (2) holding that a marine insurer that filed an interpleader action and deposited the policy limits with the court was obligated to pay legal interest in excess of the policy limits; and (3) applying the incorrect interest rate and awarding interest from the incorrect date. The court held that because the Excess Insurers' liability had not been triggered at the time the Excess Insurers filed their interpleader complaint, the district court erred in finding that they unreasonably delayed in depositing the policy limit into the court's registry and holding them liable for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues.

Defendant was convicted of unlawfully transporting an illegal alien. Defendant appealed his conviction, specifically the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a temporary investigative stop by Border Patrol agents on Interstate 35 near Cotulla, Texas. The court held that the circumstances known and the conduct observed by the agents were sufficient to warrant reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and affirmed the conviction.

This case arose when Shoe Show, Inc. (Shoe Show) entered into a lease as lessee of a store space in a shopping mall in Houston, Texas. The lease expressly prohibited Shoe Show from operating another business under the name "The SHOE DEPT." or any "substantially similar trade-name," within two miles of the leased premises. Shoe Show subsequently opened a retail footwear store under the name "SHOE SHOW" in a commercial center located less than a quarter mile from the mall in which the leased premises was located. At issue was whether the two trade names were substantially similar. The court held that, under the uncontested facts of the case and the discrete provisions of the lease, the trade name SHOE SHOW was not substantially similar to The SHOE DEPT. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of the motion to reopen and the request to stay the removal order, determining that, pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, petitioner's failure to report for removal rendered him ineligible for consideration of additional relief. At issue was whether petitioner was a fugitive under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court was persuaded by the Second and Seventh Circuits and held that petitioner became a fugitive when he did not surrender for removal despite that his address was known to authorities. Therefore, in accordance with the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the court was barred from further review of the petition and the petition was dismissed.

After multiple appeals to the court and extensive trial and other proceedings, plaintiffs' Title VII class action for employment discrimination against Lufkin Industries, Inc. (Lufkin) culminated in a favorable multimillion dollar judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties subsequently challenged the district court's attorneys' fee award and Lufkin's complaint that back pay damages were erroneously authorized in an earlier appeal. The court affirmed as to the back pay damages but vacated and remanded as to the attorneys' fees. In particular, given the unrebutted evidence in the record that it was necessary for plaintiffs to retain counsel from outside the Eastern District of Texas, the district court abused its discretion in failing to use the rate counsel charged in their home district as the starting point in the lodestar calculation.

Plaintiffs sued, inter alia, the Covington County School District, its Board of Education, its president, and other persons, in their official and individual capacities (collectively, Education Defendants), as well as other known and unknown persons, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging violations of Jane Doe's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights and various state law violations where the Education Defendants were deliberately indifferent to nine-year-old Jane's safety when they forced her into the sole custody of an unauthorized adult who took her off of the school's grounds. At issue was what were the circumstances under which a compulsory-attendance, elementary public school had a "special relationship" with its nine-year-old students such that it had a constitutional "duty to protect" their personal security. The court held that plaintiffs have pleaded a facially plausible claim that the school violated Jane's substantive due process rights by virtue of its special relationship with her and its deliberate indifference to known threats to her safety. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the Education Defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, affirmed that court's qualified immunity dismissal of plaintiffs' special relationship claims against those Education Defendants sued in their individual capacities, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.