Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Petitioner raised five claims on appeal of the district court's decision to deny him a certificate of appealability (COA): (1) ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel declined a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of murder; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to investigate and plan a mitigation defense for the punishment phase; (3) the penalty phase jury charge denied his due process rights and violated the Eighth Amendment because it did not inform the jury that petitioner would automatically receive a life sentence if the jurors did not reach a unanimous verdict on one or both of the special issues; (4) the trial court deprived petitioner of due process by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder; and (5) the trial court violated petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by not instructing the jury that the state bore the burden of proof to negate his mitigation evidence. The court addressed each claim and held that petitioner had not demonstrated that he was entitled to a COA. Accordingly, petitioner's request for a COA was denied.

Appellants, Peachtree Construction, Ltd. (Peachtree) and Great American Insurance Company (Great American), which was Peachtree's excess liability insurer, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Colony Insurance Company (Colony), which was the primary liability insurer to Peachtree and Peachtree's subcontractor (CrossRoads). Great American also appealed the lower court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of its complaint in intervention. At issue was whether, under Texas law, an insurer's duty to indemnify an insured was subordinate to the insurer's duty to defend that insured and whether an excess liability insurer could maintain a subrogation claim against a primary liability insurer after the insured had been fully indemnified. The court held that, in light of D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Market Int'l Ins. Co., the district court's summary judgment for Colony was both premature and incorrect where the proffered evidence was more that sufficient to raise a question of fact concerning the existence of a "causal connection relation" between CrossRoads' subcontracted work and the accident in the underlying suit. The court also held that Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. did not control Great American's contractual subrogation claim against Colony and therefore, the court vacated the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) order that dismissed Great American's complaint in intervention.

Petitioner was convicted in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana district court for sexually abusing the ten-year-old daughter of his girlfriend at the time. Eight years later, the daughter voluntarily approached the parish district attorney's office to recant her testimony under oath. After unsuccessfully pursuing state postconviction relief, petitioner subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus application, which the district court dismissed. On appeal, this court held that the proper court to review whether the Louisiana Fifth Circuit deprived petitioner of due process during his postconviction proceedings was either the Louisiana Supreme Court, which dismissed his direct appeal of the decision, or the U.S. Supreme Court, to which he never petitioned for certiorari review of his state postconviction proceedings. The court concluded that, as a federal appeals court entertaining a federal habeas corpus application, it was without jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of petitioner's state postconviction proceedings by the "no state habeas infirmities" rule. Accordingly, the denial of habeas corpus relief was affirmed.

Appellants, owners of interstate natural gas pipelines subject to a 25% ad valorem tax under Louisiana Constitution article 7, section 18, brought and won a state court suit alleging certain intrastate pipelines were unconstitutionally given more favorable tax treatment by being taxed only 15% from 1994-2003. At issue was whether the state court's revaluation process violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses, via 42 U.S.C. 1983, where that court ordered appellants' tax liability to be recalculated under the same fair-market-value determination process to which the intrastate pipelines were subjected. The court held that the district court properly dismissed appellants' suit because their federal claims were barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, which deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over suits that sought to interfere with the administration of state tax systems so long as the state provided an adequate procedural vehicle for raising the claims and where appellants have raised their claims in state court and the Louisiana courts did not cease to provide a plain, speedy, or efficient remedy for appellants' injuries. Accordingly, the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss.

This suit stemmed from the efforts of plaintiff and its owner and founder to obtain a patent for an invention related to personalized postage stamps and the suit involved state law claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a patent application. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff's claims were time-barred such that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that in the alternative, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the causation elements of plaintiff's claims. The court held that this case raised issues of patent law, and those issues were substantial because of the special federal interest in developing a uniform body of patent law in the Federal Circuit as recognized in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co. and expressed by Congress's grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases to that court. Therefore, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the suit to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631.

The Estate of Mable Dean Bradley (Estate) filed suit against defendants, excess insurers, in federal district court seeking recovery for defendants' alleged bad faith failure to indemnify the Mariner defendants in an underlying state lawsuit and settlement. At issue was whether the district court properly denied the Estate's motion for summary judgment against both insurers, finding as a matter of law that defendants' respective policies did not require them to defend or indemnify Mariner in the lawsuit. The court held that because the actual facts giving rise to liability in the underlying suit occurred outside of defendants' policies, neither excess insurer had a duty to indemnify Mariner for the judgment or settlement in the underlying state suit. Therefore, there could be no breach of denying coverage. The Estate's bad faith action failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, summary judgment was affirmed.

Appellant appealed the district court's summary judgment on her ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), claim to recover denied health care benefits and the magistrate judge's decision to limit discovery. At issue was the scope of admissible evidence and permissible discovery in an ERISA action to recover benefits under section 1132(a)(1)(B). The court held that the district court too narrowly defined the scope of discovery where appellant sought to discover evidence that would indicate whether the administrative record was complete, whether Blue Cross complied with ERISA's procedural requirements, and whether Blue Cross previously afforded coverage claims related to the jaw, teeth, or mouth. The court concluded that appellant's discovery request was at least reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of some admissible evidence and that the district court's abuse of discretion prejudiced appellant's ability to demonstrate that Blue Cross failed to comply with ERISA's procedural requirements. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed convictions stemming from his fraudulent application to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for disaster-relief benefits following Hurricane Katrina. At issue was whether the district court could consider defendant's rehabilitative needs when revoking his supervised release and could require him to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. The court held that because the plain language and operation of 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) and (g), which governed post-revocation sentencing, permitted the consideration of rehabilitative needs, and because defendant's sentence was not otherwise unreasonable, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case stemmed from the transportation excise tax that National Airlines (National) owed the government. Plaintiff appealed the district court's summary judgment determination that, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6672, he was personally liable for the excise taxes that National collected from its passengers but failed to pay over to the United States during his tenure as National's CEO. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the district court properly found that plaintiff was a "responsible person" and that his failure to pay taxes was willful as defined by this circuit's precedents.

Defendant appealed from the district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff in a breach of contract and negligence suit where plaintiff hired defendant to investigate land and provide a design that would allow for construction of plaintiff's stores on the site. The parties entered into a geotechnical services contract, which provided that "[e]ach party shall bear its own expenses of litigation," and a testing and inspection contract which included an indemnification clause. At issue was whether, under Mississippi law, the contractual agreement between the parties permitted for an award of attorney's fees, and if so, whether the district court's fee award was an abuse of discretion. Having found that the testing and inspection contract was the only basis for an award of attorney's fees, the court held that the district court's fee award was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded for further proceedings.