Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's decision that certain deeds appellant held were legal nullities. The panel certified a question to the Mississippi Supreme Court which stated: "When a minority member of a Mississippi limited liability company prepares and executes, on behalf of the LLC, a deed to substantially all of the LLC's real estate, in favor of another LLC of which the same individual is the sole owner, without authority to do so under the first LLC's operating agreement, is the transfer of real property pursuant to the deed: (i) voidable, such that it is subject to the intervening rights of a subsequent bonafide purchaser for value and without notice, or (ii) void ab initio, i.e., a legal nullity?" The Mississippi Supreme Court explained that the deed was neither voidable nor void ab initio, but "void and of no legal effect" because the minority member (" Michael Earwood"), as an agent of Kinwood Capital Group, L.L.C. ("Kinwood"), lacked actual or apparent authority to convey Kinwood's 520-acre tract of land and Kinwood never ratified the purported transfer.

Petitioner entered a conditional plea where he admitted that he was a citizen and native of Mexico illegally present in the United States and that he knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting commerce which had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. At issue was whether petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, violated the Second Amendment and whether his conviction violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court held that the phrase "the people" in the Second Amendment did not include aliens illegally in the United States such as petitioner and that section 922(g)(5) was constitutional under the Second Amendment. The court also held that the text of the conditional guilty plea only reserved petitioner's right to appeal on the grounds that the statute violated the Second Amendment and therefore, did not reach the merits of whether petitioner's due process rights were violated.

Petitioner was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine, using a telephone to facilitate drug trafficking, and money laundering. Petitioner appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition arguing that his conviction of money laundering must be overturned based on the holding in United States v. Santos because no evidence was presented that he engaged in a financial transaction involving profits as opposed to gross revenue derived from his illegal drug activity. The court held that Santos did not decriminalize financial transactions conducted with funds from drug activity and therefore, petitioner could not demonstrate his actual innocence, which was one of the threshold requirements for the petition to proceed. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of his petition was affirmed.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus where he was convicted of armed robbery. At issue was whether petitioner was denied due process when the trial court admitted an arrest warrant affidavit containing hearsay statements. The court held that defendant failed to establish a due process violation where the admission of the warrant affidavit did not render his trial fundamentally unfair because the warrant affidavit was not at the heart of the case against defendant and the brief references to it at trial did not permeate the entire case. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment denying federal habeas relief.

The Elijah Group, Inc. ("Church") sued the City of Leon Valley ("City") alleging that the City's prohibition of the Church from performing religious services on certain properties violated Texas state law, the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1), and both the Texas and U.S. Constitutions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Church's claims under the Equal Terms Clause of the RLUIPA. The court held that the City's imposition of its land use regulation violated the Equal Terms Clause where the ordinance treated the Church on terms that were less than equal to the terms on which it treated similarly situated nonreligious institutions. Accordingly, the district court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed the district court's award to plaintiff of prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of five percent to the date of its final judgment where plaintiff initially sued defendant for fraud and breach of contract in connection with the sale of securities. At issue was whether defendant's deposit of plaintiff's damages into the registry of the district court should prevent the accrual of prejudgment interest at the statutory rate after that date. Because such a result would be inconsistent with the purpose of prejudgment interest and would undermine the rule applied to awards of prejudgment interest by the Supreme Court of Texas, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Donald McKinley and Christopher Villasana sued the Texas Attorney General seeking a declaratory judgment that Texas Penal Code 38.12(d)(2)(A) and 38.12(d)(2)(C) (collectively, "Barratry Statute"), violated the Texas and United States Constitutions. At issue was whether the district court erred when it failed to dismiss the state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds; whether the district court should have dismissed both McKinley's and Villasana's claims for lack of standing; and whether the Barratry Statute violated the United State's Constitution's First Amendment guarantee to free speech. The court dismissed the state law claims and held that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit where Greg Abbott was sued in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas for violations of the Texas Constitution. The court also held that, because Villasana was a resident of Harris County and had not alleged that he practiced outside of the counties affected by the injunction, his claims were dismissed as moot. The court held, however, that McKinley had standing where his actions might violate the Barratry Statute and he had also established the necessary causal link and redressability. Because the Barratry Statute regulated speech that was lawful and not misleading, the court used the three-prong inquiry set forth in Central Hudson and held that the Barratry Statute did not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.

Appellants brought this appeal challenging criminal convictions related to an enterprise to conspire, possess, and distribute controlled substances. Appellants, individually and together, raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that a review of the record, as well as an examination of the briefs, revealed that appellants did conspire to possess and traffic controlled substances. The evidence yielded proof of the transaction's cessation only when law enforcement personnel interrupted the sale at the Berry Lot. In light of the deference the court's standards of review afford a district court in the administration of the trial, the arguments presented by appellants did not compel reversal on any of the issues discussed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court on all respects.

Defendant pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy charge involving "50 grams or more" of cocaine base. At issue was whether the Government breached defendant's plea agreement by using his immunized statements to advocate for the presentence investigation report ("PSR") guideline calculation. The court held that such use was inconsistent with any reasonable understanding of defendant's plea agreement, and that the Government's proffered justifications for such use were devoid of merit. Accordingly, the court held that the Government breached defendant's plea agreement and he was entitled to resentencing before a different judge.

Plaintiffs brought an enforcement suit against defendants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that defendants' practice of offering discounted telephone services to employees and retirees ("Concession") was not a pension plan in whole or in part. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that the district court did not err in holding that Concession was one plan, at least as it regarded to all retirees; in refusing to examine the out-of-region retiree Concession in isolation; in concluding that although Concession did provide income to some retirees, such income was incidental to the benefit, and was not designed for the purpose of paying retirement income; and in holding that Concession did not result in a deferral of income.