Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for various federal crimes, including, inter alia, conspiracy to traffic in narcotics, membership in a criminal enterprise, murder, and attempted murder. At issue was whether defendant was competent to stand trial; whether defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective representation was violated; and whether defendant was entitled to a new round of jury selection after his co-defendant pleaded guilty. The court held that the district court's competency finding was neither arbitrary or unwarranted where, although defendant had some symptoms of paranoia, he was competent because he was able to consult with his attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and was able to understand the proceeding. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel where he intentionally refused to cooperate with his able and diligent court-appointed lawyers, was given ample opportunity to communicate with them, and simply refused to do so. The court further held that the district court adequately explained what the counsel liaison's role was and that the district court did not interfere with the attorney-client relationship. The court also held that when one or more joint defendants faced the death penalty at the time the jury was selected, death-qualification was constitutionally permissible and the court further held that if all of the capital defendants plead guilty following voir dire, the trial court need not allow a new jury to be selected. In this instance, the jury had already been selected at the time the co-defendant entered his guilty plea and defendant did not allege that the jury instructions were deficient or rebutted the presumption that the jury properly applied its instruction. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Appellant and his wife sued Halliburton Company ("KBR"), alleging claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium where the claims stemmed from the wife's work in Iraq as a civilian contractor for KBR. At issue was whether the district court erred by concluding that appellant could not, as a matter of law, maintain a loss of consortium claim because the claim arose from a civil rights violation against his wife. The court held that, under Texas law, a loss of consortium claim was derivative of the tortfeasor's liability to the physically injured person. Therefore, where appellant's loss of consortium claim derived solely from his wife's civil rights claim, his right to recover under Title VII could not be supported by his loss of consortium claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellant defaulted on his mortgage payments and filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to prevent foreclosure on his home. In his proposed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, appellant sought to "modify" the Internal Revenue Service's secured claims for long-overdue tax deficiencies into long-term debt payable over a period of fifteen years. The court held that appellant could not do so because those tax deficiencies were not debts whose pre-bankruptcy payment terms included a final payment date that fell beyond the five-year term of appellant's Chapter 13 plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the challenged portion of the order of the bankruptcy court denying confirmation and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a county judge in Mississippi, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly causing plaintiff to be prosecuted without probable cause. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the district court did not explain the constitutional right that he had purportedly violated and, under the circumstances of the case, plaintiff had not shown that defendant's actions tainted the deliberations of the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant or the grand jury that returned the indictment. The court also held that, because the appeal was resolved on grounds of qualified immunity, the court need not address whether defendant was entitled to judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment.

Defendant filed suit in state court demanding compensation from the State of Louisiana for the commandeering of its real property following Hurricane Katrina. While the state court litigation was pending, the United States initiated condemnation proceedings involving part of the same property in federal district court. To avoid potentially conflicting judgments, the United States sought a stay of the state court proceedings. The district court entered a stay and defendant appealed. At issue was whether the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, precluded the issuance of the stay and even if not prohibited, the issuance of the stay was not proper on the facts of the case. The court found that, in light of Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, the uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the property at issue and the extent of the United States' interest militated in favor of enjoining the state court litigation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court noted that the district court would need to determine the best manner in which to proceed in reaching an answer to the title questions that arose because of the commandeering. The court concluded that the district court might resolve the question itself, lift the stay for the limited purpose of allowing the state court to determine title, or take other steps to avoid the potential for inconsistent rulings in the two proceedings.

This case stemmed from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of a family-owned oil and gas drilling business. The Nancy Sue Davis Trust ("Trust") filed a motion to revoke a confirmation order from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing for fraud and alleged that it had recently become aware that former advisers of the family and various representatives of the purchasing entities had engaged in fraud that enabled them to buy out the family's interests far below market value. At issue was whether the plan of reorganization and confirmation order barred the assertion of fraud claims against defendants. The court held that all family members, including the Trust, were continuously represented by sophisticated counsel and could have elected zealously to pursue their remedies under Chapter 11 rather than succumb to the hasty process that occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the bankruptcy court denying the Trust's motion to pursue its claims against appellees was affirmed.

The Louisiana Attorney General appealed the district court's order granting the habeas corpus petition filed by defendant where defendant's first trial ended in a declaration of mistrial. When the State sought to retry him on the murder charge, defendant moved to prevent the trial under the doctrine of Double Jeopardy and his motion was granted but then reversed on appeal. Defendant then filed for federal habeas relief and the State stayed his prosecution pending the disposition of his federal petition. The state argued that the district court erred by concluding that the state trial judge intentionally goaded the defense into requesting a mistrial. The court held, as a preliminary matter, that the district court did not err by conducting a de novo review of defendant's state court proceedings and applied the same standard when reviewing his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The court held that testimony failed to show that the state trial judge intentionally acted in bad faith nor did the testimony show that he limited disclosure about the jury's vote to intentionally goad the defense into consenting to a mistrial. Accordingly, the district court's order was vacated and defendant's petition for habeas relief was denied.

This appeal stemmed from a construction firm's attempt to obtain a refund of federal employment taxes and an abatement of interest and penalties. At issue was whether remittances of employment withholding taxes by plaintiff constituted tax payments or deposits. The court held that the district court correctly determined that the remittances were payments and refunds of these payments were subject to the time limitations of 26 U.S.C. 6511.

Defendant appealed his three-count conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession and sentenced to 30 months imprisonment to be served consecutively to certain state sentences that had yet to be imposed. At issue was whether the government violated defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by referencing, during trial, his silence in response to police questioning; whether the government was required to prove that defendant knew the firearm in his possession had moved in interstate commerce; and whether the district court erred in requiring defendant to serve his federal sentence consecutively to a state sentence that had not been imposed. The court held that the legal error that defendant claimed was not clear under existing law and, even assuming arguendo, that it was error to allow testimony regarding his pre-Miranda silence, the decision to allow that testimony did not constitute reversible error because the error was not plain. The court also held that the government was not required to prove that he knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce where his argument was foreclosed by United States v. Rose when the defendant raised the same argument in that case and the court rejected it. The court further held that the district court did not err in its sentencing order where defendant conceded that his argument was foreclosed by precedent. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence were affirmed.

Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, having never made any withdrawals from a trust with a spendthrift provision that was created by his grandmother. Appellee, debtor's bankruptcy trustee, sought to bring funds of the trust into the bankruptcy estate, free of trust. At issue was whether debtor was entitled to acquire any of the trust's assets by virtue of its withdrawal provision. The court held that debtor's grandmother was the sole settlor of the trust; that the grandmother was living on debtor's 30th birthday, so his withdrawal right "at age 30" never accrued; that the grandmother's death after debtor's 30 birthday, but before his 35th birthday, satisfied the condition precedent to the accrual of debtor's withdrawal right "at age 35"; even though debtor never exercised his age-35 withdrawal right before he filed for bankruptcy protection at age 37, he remained entitled to withdraw assets worth one-half of the value of all trust principal on hand, calculated as of his 35th birthday; and debtor's bankruptcy trustee was therefore entitled to withdraw the trust principal that remained in trust on trustor's 35th birthday. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court to the extent it reversed the bankruptcy court and authorized appellee to exercise debtor's right to withdraw a portion of the trust's principal and remanded for further proceedings.