Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a chapter 7 debtor, appealed an order affirming the bankruptcy court's ruling that certain of his debts were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4). At issue was whether appellant's debts, which were loans obtained from a partnership that he managed in his capacity as officer and director of the partnership's corporate general partner, were incurred through defalcation while he was acting as a fiduciary to the partnership. The court affirmed the order and held that appellant willfully neglected a duty owed to the partnership in connection with the loans where he acted in a fiduciary capacity to the partnership and where, even if the existence of the loans themselves were not a defalcation, the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that appellant recklessly breached his duty to the partnership by failing to protect it against the increasing financial risks of those loans.

Defendant appealed a jury trial conviction of conspiring to possess the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. At issue was whether the district court erred as to restrictions on cross-examinations, on alleged opinion testimony about his mental state, and on a clear but corrected error in a jury instruction. Also at issue was whether evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense and whether defendant's sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court held that the district court's limitations did not prevent the jury from receiving information to appraise the biases and motives of witnesses and therefore, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, that testimony from an undercover Drug Enforcement Agent was admissible opinion testimony, and that the jury error was not reversible error. The court also held that a rational jury could have found that the evidence presented established the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that defendant failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness as to his sentence.

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal's ("BIA")order of removal where he was convicted of illegally transporting aliens. At issue was whether petitioner's decision to take administrative voluntary departure in lieu of deportation, subsequent to his prior conviction in 1982 for illegal entry into the United States, was under threat of deportation and whether voluntary departure under threat of deportation established a break in continuous residence. The court held that it had no jurisdiction to review petitioner's voluntary departure which required a factual determination and that petitioner's voluntary departure in lieu of deportation interrupted his alleged continuous residence. The court also held that there was therefore no compelling indication that the BIA incorrectly concluded that petitioner was ineligible for lawful permanent resident ("LPR") status based on his 1982 voluntary departure and thus he was ineligible for LPR cancellation of removal.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his jury conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. At issue was whether police officers violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in an illegal search, whether the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support a conviction, and whether the district court made erroneous evidentiary rulings that required reversal. The court held that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated where officers had probable cause to search a vehicle that contained evidence against defendant. The court also held that, based upon the evidence presented at trial, a rational jury could have found that defendant knowingly possessed the crack cocaine. The court further held that the district court's evidentiary rulings were not erroneous where non-assertive oral conduct was not hearsay, a witness' testimony was not speculative, and the admitted Auto Zone registration card was a business record and not unfairly prejudicial.

Plaintiffs sued Allstate Indemnity Company ("Allstate") to recover additional insurance payments for damage to their home resulting from Hurricane Katrina. At issue was whether plaintiffs' witness was properly excluded and whether additional penalties against Allstate should have been awarded. Also at issue was whether the provisions in plaintiffs' homeowners policy was misconstrued and consequently plaintiffs were awarded too little. The court affirmed judgment and held that the district court properly excluded the report and testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness; awarded plaintiffs an additional amount in wind damage; concluded that the terms of the Extended Limits Endorsement and the Additional Living Expenses provisions did not apply to plaintiffs; concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1220 damages; concluded that the 2003 version of Louisiana Revised Statute 22:658 applied to plaintiffs' claim; awarded penalties on plaintiffs' wind damage claims; and found that Allstate was not liable for penalties on plaintiffs' contents claim.

Defendant appealed his guilty plea conviction of being a dishonorable discharge in possession of firearms where defendant's U.S. Air Force DD-214 certificate of release form ("DD-214") was not sent to him when the Air Force incorrectly believed that it did not have defendant's valid mailing address. At issue was whether defendant knew that he was actually discharged and whether the government had to prove that defendant had knowledge of his status as a felon to establish a violation under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court affirmed the conviction and held that the government was not required to prove defendant knew he had been dishonorably discharged from the Air Force at the time of his offense and that defendant's discharge was effective when his DD-214 was ready for delivery.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendant seeking to sue on behalf of themselves and all other individuals who were exposed to the petroleum coke dust released from defendant's refinery. At issue was whether the district court's order certifying a class was an abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in determining that common issues predominated and in certifying the class where the district court had not seriously considered the administration of the trial when it failed to adequately analyze and balance the common issues against the individual issues.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief where it was time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDA"). At issue was whether petitioner failed to demonstrate rare or exceptional circumstances meriting application of equitable tolling where petitioner was confined in a state transfer facility for a period of time with an inadequate law library. The court held that petitioner was properly denied habeas relief where he failed to allege sufficient facts to show that he was prevented from timely filing for habeas relief and where the record indicated that further proceedings were unlikely to uncover such facts.

Plaintiff sued defendant, Chicago Title Insurance Co., on behalf of a purported class for refusing to give her a title insurance premium discount mandated by Texas law. At issue was whether plaintiff had shown that questions common to the class predominated over questions only affecting individual members as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The court held that class certification was properly denied where the only issues to be determined were related to individualized inquires as to whether particular persons qualified for the discounted insurance and if they were denied it.

Defendant appealed his conviction after pleading guilty to possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony where he was sentenced as a career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). At issues was whether defendant's prior conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery was a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA. The court held that defendant's conviction was proper where conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery presented a sufficiently "serious potential risk of physical injury to another" to be classified as a crime of violence and therefore considered a "violent felony" within the meaning of the "residual clause."