Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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On July 29, 2007, Noel Dean’s wife, Shannon, died from a gunshot wound at their home after she became severely intoxicated and after Noel confronted her with evidence of an affair. Noel reported that Shannon shot herself, but law enforcement suspected homicide. The next day, Dr. Darshan Phatak, an assistant medical examiner, performed the autopsy. Initially, he could not determine whether the death was a homicide or suicide and marked the cause as “pending.” After meeting with colleagues and reviewing police interviews and other evidence, Dr. Phatak concluded the gun’s orientation at the time of the shooting was inconsistent with Noel’s account and classified the death as a homicide in the official autopsy report. This report contributed to Noel’s arrest and indictment for murder. During a subsequent trial, photographic overlays created by Dr. Phatak’s supervisor suggested the gun orientation matched Noel’s story, prompting a change in the autopsy report’s classification to “undetermined” and a dismissal of charges.Noel Dean then filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Dr. Phatak intentionally fabricated the autopsy report. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Dr. Phatak’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, relying on allegations rather than evidence. On initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for proper consideration of the summary judgment record. After further briefing and significant delay, the district court again denied summary judgment, applying a “deliberate indifference” standard.On this second interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by using a “deliberate indifference” test rather than determining whether a rational juror could find Dr. Phatak intentionally misstated his conclusions. The appellate court vacated the denial of summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard. View "Dean v. Phatak" on Justia Law

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Juan Carlos Alvarez, a member of the Southwest Cholos gang, was convicted of capital murder for his involvement in two separate fatal shootings in Houston, Texas in June 1998. The first incident resulted in the deaths of Adrian and Michael Aguirre at an apartment complex, while the second led to the murder of sixteen-year-old Jose Varela and Hugo Perez. Alvarez was identified through eyewitness accounts, testimony from co-participants, forensic evidence, and his own admissions to police. The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence, including ballistics linking Alvarez’s firearm to the shootings and DNA evidence connecting his shotgun to one of the victims. At trial, Alvarez was represented by two attorneys; the defense focused on challenging witness credibility and provided mitigation evidence through family members and a psychologist.On appeal, Alvarez’s counsel raised numerous claims in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA), which affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Subsequent state habeas proceedings involved multiple attorneys and filings, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and issues regarding consultation with the Mexican consulate. Alvarez also asserted the introduction of tainted DNA evidence and misconduct by the Houston Crime Lab. The TCCA dismissed some of these habeas applications as an abuse of the writ, finding certain claims procedurally barred. Alvarez then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which denied all claims and refused to grant investigative funding or a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, analyzing three certified claims: deprivation of counsel due to one attorney allegedly sleeping during trial, ineffective assistance for failing to present additional mitigation evidence, and claims regarding tainted DNA evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that Alvarez was not constitutionally deprived of counsel since his second attorney was actively engaged, and there was no unreasonable application of federal law or unreasonable factual determination by the state courts. It also found no ineffective assistance in the mitigation phase and concluded the DNA-related claims were procedurally barred and, alternatively, meritless. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief. View "Alvarez v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

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Antonio Campuzano, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted in Texas for “Indecency with a Child Sexual Contact” pursuant to Texas Penal Code § 21.11. After his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his offense was a “crime of child abuse” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). During removal proceedings, the government submitted various documents, including a police report and an order of deferred adjudication, to prove Campuzano’s conviction. Campuzano admitted to his citizenship status but contested the admissibility and authentication of the conviction records and denied that his conviction constituted a crime of child abuse under the INA.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Campuzano’s motions to terminate proceedings and overruled his evidentiary objections, finding him removable and denying his application for cancellation of removal. The IJ ordered him removed to Mexico. Campuzano appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), challenging the admission of conviction records, the categorical classification of his offense as a crime of child abuse, and the denial of cancellation. The BIA dismissed his appeal, holding that the methods of authenticating conviction records in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C) are not mandatory or exclusive, and that his Texas conviction is categorically a crime of child abuse under federal law.Campuzano then petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit held that the authentication methods set forth in § 1229a(c)(3)(C) are not mandatory or exclusive, and that Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1) is categorically a crime of child abuse for immigration purposes. The court denied Campuzano’s petition for review, affirming his removability. View "Campuzano v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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A Singapore-based company that supplies offshore vessels entered into a charter agreement with a Mexico-based marine oil and gas company. The agreement allowed the Mexican company to charter a vessel for eighteen months, with provisions for termination if payments were not made and an obligation to redeliver the vessel at the end of the term. After the charter expired, the Singaporean company alleged that the Mexican company failed to pay required fees and did not return the vessel, leading to arbitration in Singapore. The arbitrator awarded the Singaporean company damages and ordered the vessel’s return, but the Mexican company did not comply. Meanwhile, an email revealed that the Mexican company was set to receive a large refund from a third party, to be sent to a U.S. bank account in the name of a related U.S. entity.The Singaporean company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to attach the funds in the U.S. account as security for the arbitration award under federal maritime law and, later, Texas state law. The district court initially granted the writ of garnishment, but after limited discovery, vacated the writ, finding no evidence that the Mexican company owned the funds in the U.S. account. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its complaint to assert an alter ego theory, which would have permitted attachment based on state law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider relevant evidence and legal standards regarding ownership and control of the funds. The appellate court also determined that the district court erred in denying leave to amend without adequate explanation. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case, instructing the district court to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint. View "CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean" on Justia Law

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Three business entities and individuals associated with the operation of a retail store in Cedar Park, Texas, were subject to enforcement under a city ordinance banning “head shops”—stores selling items commonly used to ingest or inhale illegal substances. After receiving notices from the City, two of the appellants were charged in municipal court and fined for violating the ordinance, while the third appellant, a related business entity, was not charged. Following the municipal court’s judgment, the two charged parties appealed for a trial de novo in the county court, which annulled the municipal court’s judgment and began new criminal proceedings. They also pursued state habeas relief, which was still ongoing at the time of this appeal.Separately, the appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, challenging the ordinance’s validity and constitutionality under federal and state law, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, which precludes certain civil claims that would imply the invalidity of existing criminal convictions. The district court also dismissed a distinct claim related to termination of utility services.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that because the municipal court’s judgments were annulled by the trial de novo and criminal proceedings were still pending under Texas law, there were no outstanding convictions to trigger the Heck bar. Thus, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims challenging the ordinance and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the standalone water termination claim, as the appellants had disclaimed any intent to pursue it. View "Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park" on Justia Law

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A citizen advocacy group and two individuals challenged five provisions of a city ordinance in Kerrville, Texas, that regulated "canvassing" and "soliciting" activities at private residences and public streets. The ordinance defined "canvassing" as door-to-door advocacy on topics like religion, politics, or philosophy, and "soliciting" as seeking donations or advertising services, with both activities subject to restrictions on timing, signage, permitting, and location. Plaintiffs argued that these rules chilled their protected speech, including political canvassing, religious outreach, and commercial solicitation, and feared fines under the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas considered the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing as to most provisions except the rule applying to minors. On the merits, the district court enjoined enforcement of the permitting requirement for solicitors but declined to enjoin the hours, signage, and street restrictions, finding those likely constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit agreed that plaintiffs had standing except as to the minor-related provision. It held that the hours and signage restrictions—because they targeted canvassing based on content—must be reviewed under strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found the city failed to justify the streets provision even under intermediate scrutiny and remanded for further injunction analysis. It affirmed the injunction against the permitting requirement but vacated it as overbroad, directing the district court to limit relief to the plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit denied as moot the motion for an injunction pending appeal. View "LIA Network v. City of Kerrville" on Justia Law

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Aramark, a company that self-funds employee health benefit plans governed by ERISA, contracted with Aetna to serve as third-party administrator for these plans. Under the agreement, Aetna was responsible for processing claims, managing provider networks, and handling various administrative tasks. Aramark alleged that Aetna breached its fiduciary duties by paying improper or fraudulent claims, retaining undisclosed fees, providing inadequate subrogation services, making post-adjudication adjustments detrimental to Aramark, and commingling plan assets.Aramark filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, asserting ERISA claims for breach of fiduciary duty and prohibited transactions. Aetna responded by seeking to compel arbitration in a Connecticut federal district court, relying on the arbitration clause in the parties’ Master Services Agreement (MSA), and moved to stay the Texas proceedings pending arbitration. The district court denied the stay, holding that the parties had not “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the threshold question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The court found that the MSA's arbitration clause carved out disputes seeking equitable relief—such as Aramark’s ERISA claims—from arbitration and that these claims were equitable in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a motion to stay litigation pending arbitration de novo. It held that the threshold issue of arbitrability was not clearly and unmistakably delegated to an arbitrator under the terms of the MSA, especially given the placement of the carve-out for equitable relief. The Fifth Circuit further held that Aramark’s ERISA claims constituted equitable, not legal, relief under Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders, finding no error or abuse of discretion. View "Aramark Services v. Aetna Life Insurance" on Justia Law

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A former professional football player sought disability benefits from a retirement plan administered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), arguing that he qualified for the highest tier of benefits due to multiple concussions suffered during his career. The plan granted him some benefits but denied the top category. He filed suit, claiming improper denial of benefits and lack of a full and fair review.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the plan to award the higher benefits and granting approximately $1.2 million in attorney’s fees, plus $600,000 in conditional fees. On appeal, however, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to reclassification to the highest benefits tier due to his failure to immediately appeal the denial, making any further review futile. The panel remanded for entry of judgment for the plan.On remand, the district court nonetheless reaffirmed its prior fee award, reasoning that the plaintiff’s success in exposing flaws in the plan’s review process, as reflected in favorable factual findings, constituted sufficient success to support attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reviewing the fee award for abuse of discretion, reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), attorney’s fees may only be awarded if a party achieves “some degree of success on the merits,” which requires more than favorable factual findings or moral victories. Because the plaintiff received no relief—monetary, injunctive, or declaratory—the award of attorney’s fees was improper. The court reversed the fee award. View "Cloud v. NFL Player Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

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Kun Liao, a native and citizen of China, sought relief from removal by applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge denied these applications. Liao appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal on April 10, 2025. He then filed motions to reconsider and to reopen the case; however, the motion to reconsider was deemed untimely, and the motion to reopen was denied for lack of new evidence. Liao also moved to stay removal, which the BIA denied as moot.Following the BIA’s final order denying his motions on July 2, 2025, Liao filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. His petition was received by the clerk on August 11, forty days after the BIA’s order, exceeding the statutory thirty-day deadline set by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). The government promptly moved to deny Liao’s petition for untimeliness. The Fifth Circuit noted that Liao’s previous petition had been dismissed for failure to file his brief timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the thirty-day filing deadline for petitions for review is a mandatory claim-processing rule, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Riley v. Bondi. Because the government did not waive its objection to Liao’s untimely filing and Liao failed to satisfy the requirements of the prison mailbox rule, the Fifth Circuit enforced the deadline and denied the petition for review. All other motions pending with the case were dismissed as moot. View "Liao v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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The essential facts of this case involve an individual who was convicted in Mississippi state court for failing to pay child support, an offense punishable by up to five years in prison but for which he ultimately received only probation. After repaying the owed child support and completing probation, the individual was later indicted under federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The predicate offense for the federal charge was the non-payment of child support.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him, among other constitutional challenges. The district court denied both motions. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that, under the historical inquiry required by the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, there is no historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of a person convicted solely of non-payment of child support, particularly where the debt had been repaid and probation completed. The court rejected the government’s analogy between debtors and thieves, noting that founding-era practices treated debtors differently, allowing for temporary disarmament only until the debt was paid. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant violated the Second Amendment and reversed the conviction, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Cockerham" on Justia Law