Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Wesley Swick pled guilty to possessing a stolen firearm and was sentenced to 33 months in prison and two years of supervised release. His federal sentence was to run concurrently with longer state sentences. Swick was released from state prison in 2017 but did not report to federal probation as required. His failure to report went unnoticed until after his supervised release period should have ended. During this time, Swick committed several state crimes and served additional time in state prison.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas revoked Swick's supervised release based on his failure to report and subsequent criminal activities. The court asserted jurisdiction using the fugitive tolling doctrine, which pauses the supervised release period when a supervisee absconds from supervision. Swick was sentenced to 24 months in prison, to run consecutively with a separate federal sentence for a felon-in-possession charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that fugitive tolling applies to supervised release, meaning that Swick's supervised release period was tolled when he failed to report to probation. The court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Swick intentionally avoided supervision, as he did not report to federal probation despite knowing his obligation to do so. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to revoke Swick's supervised release and the imposition of the 24-month prison sentence. View "United States v. Swick" on Justia Law

James Ethridge, a Texas resident, purchased a Samsung 18650 lithium-ion battery from a Wyoming-based seller on Amazon in October 2018. The battery exploded in his pocket in November 2019, causing severe burns and other injuries. Ethridge filed a personal injury lawsuit in Texas state court in 2021 against Samsung SDI Company, Firehouse Vapors LLC, and two Amazon entities. He later added Macromall LLC as a defendant. After dismissing Firehouse Vapors, the remaining defendants removed the case to federal court. Ethridge then dismissed Macromall, leaving Samsung and the Amazon entities as defendants.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Amazon defendants and dismissed Samsung for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ethridge appealed the dismissal of Samsung to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, voluntarily dismissing his appeal against Amazon.The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo and reversed the dismissal. The court held that Samsung had purposefully availed itself of the Texas market by shipping 18650 batteries to companies like Black & Decker, HP, and Dell in Texas. The court found that Ethridge's claims were related to Samsung's contacts with Texas, as the same type of battery that injured Ethridge was sold in Texas. The court concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over Samsung in Texas was fair and reasonable, given the state's interest in providing a forum for its injured residents and Samsung's ability to litigate in Texas. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ethridge v. Samsung SDI" on Justia Law

Tracy Turner, a railway conductor employed by BNSF Railway for fifteen years, failed two vision tests required by federal law in 2020. The first test was the Ishihara 14-plate clinical vision test, which Turner failed due to a color deficiency affecting his perception of red and green. At his request, Turner was given a second vision field test by BNSF’s medical examiner, which he also failed. Consequently, BNSF did not recertify Turner as a conductor, as required by federal regulations.Turner did not appeal the denial of his recertification through the Federal Railway Administration (FRA) administrative review process. Instead, he filed a disability-discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which provided him with a right-to-sue letter. Turner then sued BNSF, claiming that the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by not recertifying him due to his color deficiency. BNSF moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted the motion, ruling that Turner was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA and that his claim was precluded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Turner was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA because he failed to obtain the FRA-required certification and did not exhaust the available administrative remedies. The court emphasized that BNSF was bound by federal law and FRA regulations, which mandated the vision tests and certification process. Turner’s failure to pursue the FRA’s appeals process meant he could not establish an essential element of his ADA claim. View "Turner v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

Speech First, Incorporated, challenged Texas State University's harassment policy, arguing it violated the First Amendment. The policy prohibited "unwelcome verbal" or "written conduct" without defining these terms, potentially stifling speech on sensitive topics like abortion, immigration, and gender identity. Speech First claimed the policy targeted politically disfavored speech, causing students to self-censor.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas acknowledged the policy's First Amendment issues but refused to issue a preliminary injunction. Instead, it pressured the University to amend the policy. The University reluctantly complied, and the district court dismissed Speech First's motion as moot, believing the policy change resolved the issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It disagreed with the lower court's ruling that the policy change rendered the request for a preliminary injunction moot. The appellate court noted that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case unless it is absolutely clear the behavior will not recur. The court found that Texas State's policy change, made under judicial pressure, did not meet this stringent standard. The University continued to defend the original policy, and there was no controlling statement ensuring the policy would not revert.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the motion for preliminary injunctive relief. View "Speech First v. McCall" on Justia Law

In 2006, Cabot Oil & Gas Company began fracking in Dimock Township, Pennsylvania. By 2009, their operations caused a residential water well explosion, leading to methane gas contamination in local water supplies. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) found Cabot in violation of environmental laws, resulting in the 2009 Consent Order, which mandated corrective actions and a $120,000 penalty. Cabot violated this order by 2010, leading to another consent order and additional fines. Over the next decade, Cabot received numerous violation notices and faced lawsuits, including a 2020 grand jury finding of long-term indifference to remediation efforts, resulting in criminal charges and a nolo contendere plea.Shareholders filed a derivative suit against Cabot’s directors, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, including failure to oversee operations, issuing misleading statements, and insider trading. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims, finding no serious oversight failure or bad faith by the directors, and insufficient particularized allegations to support claims of material misrepresentation or insider trading.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the directors had implemented and monitored compliance systems, and that the shareholders failed to demonstrate bad faith or conscious disregard of duties. The court also found that the statements in Cabot’s disclosures were not materially misleading and that the shareholders did not adequately plead demand futility regarding the insider trading claim. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims with prejudice. View "Ezell v. Dinges" on Justia Law

Yolanda Welch Atkins, a court clerk for Macon, Mississippi, since 2003, was placed on leave in October 2020 after $3,200 in municipal court fines and fees went missing, leading to her arrest and indictment for embezzlement. Despite this, she was reinstated by the board of aldermen. In January 2021, after running unsuccessfully for mayor against Patrick Hopkins's preferred candidate, Atkins was not reappointed as court clerk when Hopkins and other aldermen did not second the motion for her reappointment.Atkins sued Hopkins and others, claiming First Amendment retaliation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment to all defendants except Hopkins, finding a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Hopkins's refusal to second the motion was due to Atkins's protected speech. Hopkins appealed the denial of summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are protected from liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The court found that existing precedent, including Sims v. City of Madisonville, did not clearly establish that Hopkins's specific conduct—refusing to second a motion—violated the First Amendment. Consequently, the court held that Hopkins was entitled to qualified immunity.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment for Hopkins and remanded the case for further proceedings, without indicating what those proceedings should entail. View "Atkins v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of individuals and entities associated with the Daughtry family, sued Silver Fern Chemical, Inc. and its employee, Gilda Franco. Silver Fern supplied the plaintiffs with a chemical called 1,4 butanediol (BDO), which can be used as a date-rape drug. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigated the distribution of BDO for illicit use and subpoenaed Silver Fern for emails related to BDO purchases. Franco altered these emails to include a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) that was not originally attached, and the plaintiffs allege this was done to aid the government in prosecuting them.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed the claims against Franco for lack of personal jurisdiction and against Silver Fern for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that Silver Fern intended for them to rely on the altered emails, nor did they show reliance on these emails to their detriment. The court also dismissed the products-liability claims, stating that the plaintiffs were not the end users of the chemical and did not suffer physical harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the fraud claims, agreeing that the plaintiffs failed to show that Silver Fern intended for them to rely on the altered emails. The court also upheld the dismissal of the civil conspiracy to commit fraud claim, as it was dependent on the underlying fraud claim. Additionally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the products-liability claims, noting that the plaintiffs did not suffer physical harm and were not the end users of the chemical.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's judgment of dismissal was correct and affirmed the decision. View "Daughtry v. Silver Fern Chemical" on Justia Law

Floyd Ruffin, a shoreline clean-up worker in Louisiana following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later. Ruffin sued BP, alleging that his exposure to crude oil during the clean-up caused his cancer. He designated Dr. Benjamin Rybicki, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, as his expert to establish causation. Rybicki claimed that Ruffin was exposed to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in crude oil, specifically pointing to benzo(a)pyrene as a carcinogen.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana excluded Rybicki’s testimony, finding it inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court concluded that Rybicki failed to identify a harmful level of exposure to PAHs necessary to cause prostate cancer and noted several methodological flaws in his analysis. Consequently, the court granted BP’s motion for summary judgment, determining that Ruffin lacked the necessary evidence to prove causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of Rybicki’s testimony and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Rybicki’s testimony was inadmissible due to significant analytical gaps. The court noted that Rybicki’s testimony did not establish a link between PAHs and prostate cancer, as his analysis focused on benzo(a)pyrene, which Ruffin did not specifically claim to have been exposed to. Additionally, the court emphasized that general causation requires showing that a substance is capable of causing the specific injury in the general population, which Rybicki’s testimony failed to do. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment in favor of BP. View "Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Erick Jose Sandoval Argueta, a Salvadoran national, was lawfully present in the United States when he solicited sex over the internet from someone he believed to be a thirteen-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover police officer. He was convicted in Texas of online solicitation of a minor. Based on this conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered him removed for committing a "crime of child abuse." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision.Sandoval Argueta filed two petitions for review. In the first, he challenged the BIA's determination of his removability and its denial of his motion to reconsider. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that Sandoval Argueta had been convicted of multiple crimes, including property theft, drug trafficking, and online solicitation of a minor. The government initially charged him with removability based on the solicitation conviction but later added charges related to his drug trafficking conviction. After the drug trafficking conviction was vacated, the government reasserted the "crime of child abuse" charge.The Fifth Circuit held that the best reading of "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) includes convictions for online solicitation of a minor, even if no actual child was involved. The court reasoned that the statute's broad language encompasses offenses that create a high risk of harm to a child, including attempt offenses. Therefore, Sandoval Argueta's conviction under Texas Penal Code § 33.021(c) categorically met the definition of a "crime of child abuse."In his second petition, Sandoval Argueta argued that the BIA erred by not considering his equitable tolling argument when denying his motion to reconsider. The Fifth Circuit found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as it was procedurally barred by statutory limits on the number of motions to reconsider and the prohibition on reconsidering a decision on a prior motion to reconsider.The Fifth Circuit denied both petitions for review. View "Argueta v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Midland Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance involving Billy Joe Russell and his girlfriend. Upon arrival, the police ordered Russell to exit the vehicle, and he informed them of a handgun in the car, which he later admitted to possessing. Russell, a felon, pleaded guilty to being in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated his base offense level to be 26 due to his prior convictions for two violent felonies and possession of a firearm capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine. The district court applied a three-point reduction for accepting responsibility, resulting in a net offense level of 23, and sentenced him to 115 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Russell did not object to the PSR or his sentence.Russell appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the district court's categorization of his 2017 Tennessee aggravated-assault conviction as a crime of violence (COV). He argued that the district court plainly erred in this categorization. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, as Russell had not objected to the categorization at the district court level.The Fifth Circuit defined a guidelines COV and applied the categorical approach to determine if Russell's 2017 conviction qualified as a COV. The court found that Russell failed to show a clear or obvious error in the district court's categorization of his 2017 conviction as a COV. Russell did not provide any case law to support his interpretation that Tennessee's aggravated-assault statute criminalizes conduct causing solely mental harm. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Russell's sentence. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law