Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Branch Metrics, Inc. brought an antitrust action against Google, LLC, alleging violations of the Sherman Act based on documents uncovered in earlier litigation brought by the United States against Google. Branch Metrics claimed Google maintained monopoly power in online search and search advertising markets, using exclusive agreements that caused anticompetitive harm. The suit was filed in the Eastern District of Texas, although most relevant witnesses and evidence were located in California.Google responded by requesting a transfer of venue to the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing that it was clearly more convenient for parties and witnesses and that the sources of proof were located there. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas permitted venue discovery but ultimately denied Google’s motion to transfer. The court found that certain private interest factors slightly favored transfer, while one public interest factor—administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion—weighed against transfer, and the rest of the factors were neutral.On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the district court misapplied the law by placing undue weight on the court congestion factor, which Fifth Circuit precedent considers speculative and non-dispositive. The appellate court held that the district court erred by allowing that single factor to override all other factors, contrary to circuit authority. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Branch Metrics’ argument that the Clayton Act insulated its choice of venue from transfer. The court granted Google’s petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the case transferred to the Northern District of California. View "In Re: Google" on Justia Law

Porch.com is the parent company of Homeowners of America Insurance Company (HOA), which entered into an agreement with Gallagher Reinsurance (Gallagher) to serve as its reinsurance broker. Gallagher brokered a reinsurance deal for HOA involving Whiterock as the insurer and Vesttoo as a financier, with the understanding that China Construction Bank (CCB) would provide a letter of credit as collateral. Instead, HOA was only given a letter from Yu Po Finance stating a letter of credit would be forthcoming, which was never issued. Gallagher continued to assure HOA that the collateral was valid, leading HOA to authorize a substantial withdrawal by Vesttoo. When it was later revealed that Vesttoo’s collateral was invalid and CCB had never issued the promised letter of credit, HOA suffered financial harm, including increased costs for replacement reinsurance and regulatory intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas heard Porch’s breach-of-contract claims against Gallagher, alleging violations of several sections of their agreement. The district court dismissed all of Porch’s claims with prejudice, finding that Gallagher did not breach the contract and that amending the complaint would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Porch’s claims under Sections 5 and 11 of the contract, concluding Gallagher had no duty to procure collateral documents from CCB or to comply with Texas insurance laws under the economic sanctions provision. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Porch’s claim under Section 13, finding that Porch plausibly alleged Gallagher failed to perform administrative services customarily expected of a reinsurance broker after contract placement. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Section 13 claim. View "Porch.com v. Gallagher Re" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at a residence in Starkville, Mississippi, after an officer obtained the warrant through an affidavit detailing three controlled drug purchases involving a confidential informant. The affidavit described the procedures followed during the buys, including continuous surveillance of the informant and searches for contraband before and after each transaction. The search resulted in the seizure of drugs, firearms, money, and cellphones, and the resident was arrested. During a subsequent police interview, the resident was read his Miranda rights and signed a form acknowledging this, but the waiver portion of the form was not read aloud or explained.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted the defendant’s motion to suppress both the physical evidence from the search and the statements made during the interview. The district court found the supporting affidavit for the search warrant to be “bare bones,” lacking sufficient detail or corroboration, and concluded that the officer’s reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable. The court further found that the defendant’s signature on the Miranda form did not amount to a voluntary waiver of his rights, as the waiver section was not explained and the officer’s conduct was considered deceptive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the affidavit was not “wholly conclusory” and contained sufficient factual detail to justify an officer’s reasonable reliance on the warrant. Thus, the suppression of the physical evidence was reversed. Regarding the statements, the appellate court agreed that the express waiver was involuntary but remanded for the district court to determine whether an implied waiver occurred under the totality of the circumstances. The panel retained jurisdiction pending the district court’s further findings. View "USA v. Weaver" on Justia Law

South Coast Supply Company, an oil and gas distribution firm, experienced severe financial distress following a dramatic decline in oil prices in 2014. To mitigate the impact, Robert Remmert, the company’s Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President, personally loaned South Coast $800,000. Remmert was repaid a total of $320,628.04 through multiple checks as funds became available. Despite these efforts, the company ultimately filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.After the bankruptcy filing, South Coast initiated a preference claim against Remmert to recover the loan repayments, a claim later assigned to Briar Capital Working Fund Capital, L.L.C. following confirmation of the bankruptcy plan. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court originally dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded that decision. On remand, a jury trial was held. The jury was asked whether Briar Capital established that Remmert received more through the loan repayments than he would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. The jury found that Briar Capital did not meet its burden.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case after Briar Capital appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by the evidence. However, because Briar Capital failed to file the necessary motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) or 50(b), the appellate court held that it was without power to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The court also found that, even under plain error review, some evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The judgment was affirmed. View "Briar Capital Working Fund v. Remmert" on Justia Law

Following two fatal airplane crashes involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, which resulted in significant loss of life, the Department of Justice investigated Boeing for misleading the Federal Aviation Administration about changes to flight control systems. The Department initially entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing, requiring the company to pay a substantial fine and undertake remedial measures. After Boeing was alleged to have breached the DPA, the Department negotiated a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again requiring compliance and penalties. Family members of crash victims challenged both the DPA and NPA, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).The families first moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to set aside the DPA, arguing they were denied timely notice and the right to confer as crime victims. The district court found the Department had not acted in bad faith but had committed a legal error in initially failing to recognize the families as crime victims. The court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to review or alter the terms of the DPA. When the Department later moved to dismiss the charges based on the NPA, the families objected, but the district court granted the motion, finding the Department had provided sufficient reasons and had not acted with bad faith.The families petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for writs of mandamus. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenge to the DPA was moot because it was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. As to the NPA, the court found the Department had satisfied the CVRA’s requirements to confer with and treat the families fairly. The court also ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to conduct a substantive review of the district court’s dismissal of charges. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. View "In re Ryan" on Justia Law

A class of inmates at the Louisiana State Penitentiary alleged that the prison’s medical care was constitutionally inadequate and that the facility failed to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The lawsuit began in 2015, and evidence was introduced at trial in 2018. In 2021, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana issued a lengthy opinion finding systemic Eighth Amendment violations and ADA/RA noncompliance. While prison officials began making improvements ahead of a scheduled remedial trial, the district court later issued a Remedial Opinion and Order, prescribing detailed institutional changes and appointing special masters to oversee compliance.The district court’s Remedial Order required the state to bear the costs of three special masters, directed broad institutional reforms, and did not expressly adhere to the limitations imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, retaining jurisdiction only for compliance procedures. After entry of judgment, the defendants appealed. During the appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the Remedial Order. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction and the validity of the district court’s orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or, alternatively, § 1292(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit found that the district court’s Remedial Order violated the PLRA by failing to apply the statutory needs-narrowness-intrusiveness standard, improperly appointing multiple special masters, and requiring the state to pay their fees. The Fifth Circuit also concluded that the district court erred by disregarding ongoing improvements to prison medical care and by misapplying the standards for injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment and the ADA/RA. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Parker v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in New Orleans began investigating a suspected methamphetamine dealer in 2020, leading them to Marshall Grace through surveillance methods such as phone records and tracking devices. Officers stopped Grace’s vehicle after observing traffic violations, detected the smell of marijuana, and subsequently searched his vehicle, finding approximately 441 grams of methamphetamine. Grace was arrested and provided a written statement admitting ownership of the drugs and detailing his ongoing involvement in distributing methamphetamine to others, including regular transactions over a two-year period. Electronic evidence from his phones corroborated his admissions and established communication with other dealers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over Grace’s trial. During jury selection, the government used peremptory strikes to exclude two of five black potential jurors, including one named Edward Davis. Grace challenged the exclusion of Davis under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing it was racially motivated. The district court questioned Davis and ultimately found the government’s reason—Davis having seven sons, one of whom had criminal justice involvement—to be race-neutral and denied Grace’s Batson challenge. The trial concluded with the jury finding Grace guilty on all counts, and the court imposed the statutory minimum sentence. Grace appealed, contesting both the sufficiency of the evidence for his conspiracy conviction and the denial of his Batson challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, given Grace’s admissions, corroborating testimony, and the quantity of drugs involved. The appellate court also found no clear error in the district court’s denial of the Batson challenge, ruling that Grace failed to show purposeful discrimination by the prosecution. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "USA v. Grace" on Justia Law

Darion Baker and Gregory Dees were driving a stolen car from California with plans to reach Tennessee. In Stratford, Texas, police officers Richard Coborn and Michael McHugh became suspicious of their vehicle, followed them to a gas station, and confirmed the car was stolen. As Baker and Dees returned to their car, the officers approached with weapons drawn and gave commands. Baker put the car in drive, and the officers fired shots—first before the car moved, then as Baker drove away. Baker was fatally shot from behind, while Dees was unharmed.The plaintiffs, including Baker’s estate and family, sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officers asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted qualified immunity for the shots fired before the car moved and ruled the second round of shots was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court regarding the first round of shots but disagreed about the second round, finding that a jury could decide whether the second round was objectively unreasonable. The panel remanded for the district court to decide whether the right was clearly established.On remand, the district court denied qualified immunity for the second round of shots, finding that the violation was clearly established. The officers appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Coborn’s conduct during the second round of shots constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Coborn was not entitled to qualified immunity for the second round of shots. View "Baker v. Coborn" on Justia Law

A woman who was pregnant while detained at the Tarrant County Jail gave birth in her cell two weeks before her due date. The infant was found stuck in her pants and was transported to the hospital, where the child died ten days later. The Medical Director at the jail, a physician who did not provide direct care to inmates in the female infirmary, had issued orders for the treatment of pregnant inmates but relied on other medical staff to carry out those orders. Days before the birth, the woman was seen by an OB/GYN, who noted her communication difficulties and recommended an elective induction of labor at 39–40 weeks, which the Medical Director approved. On the day of the birth, the woman was mentioned in the attachment to a nursing report email regarding abdominal cramps and refusal of breakfast, but not in the body of the email. The Medical Director stated he did not read the attachment before learning the birth had occurred.After the incident, the woman, through her guardian, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging the Medical Director denied her adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following discovery, the Medical Director moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and arguing he lacked subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court granted summary judgment for the Medical Director and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Medical Director did not have subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee and therefore did not act with deliberate indifference. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Medical Director. View "Congious v. Shaw" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Michael Hagar, is an individual convicted of cyberstalking and making interstate threats. He submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a copy of a specific email he sent in 2016, which became part of the FBI’s investigation. Hagar specifically sought the unredacted “To” line of recipients and the email’s complete header information, which includes technical metadata such as server paths and timestamps. The FBI initially provided the email with recipient information redacted, citing privacy exemptions, and declined to produce the header metadata, arguing it would require the creation of a new record.Following his FOIA request, Hagar filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The magistrate judge terminated Hagar’s initial summary judgment motion as premature, set a schedule for further briefing, and allowed the FBI to move for summary judgment. After the FBI sent Hagar an unredacted copy of the email, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for the FBI, agreeing that the header information would require creation of a new record and, alternatively, was exempt under FOIA. The district court adopted this recommendation, entered judgment for the FBI, and denied Hagar’s post-judgment motions and misconduct claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that because Hagar had received the “To” line information, his claim for that was moot. The court further held that FOIA does not require agencies to create new records to satisfy requests, and thus the FBI was not obligated to produce the header information. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, including denial of post-judgment motions, and dismissed Hagar’s judicial misconduct claims as meritless. View "Hagar v. FBI" on Justia Law