Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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The LSBA is a mandatory bar association. Attorneys are required to join and pay fees to the organization as a condition of practicing law in the state. Plaintiff has been a member in good standing of the LSBA since 1996. Upset that he was forced to associate with and contribute to certain causes, Plaintiff sued the LSBA, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and its justices (collectively, “the LSBA”) in 2019. He claimed that compulsory membership in the LSBA violated his rights to free speech and association. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the proper remedy. The court explained that although it takes no position on the proper injunctive or declaratory relief. The court also rendered a preliminary injunction preventing the LSBA from requiring Plaintiff to join or pay dues to the LSBA pending completion of the remedies phase. The court wrote that because the LSBA engages in non-germane speech, its mandatory membership policy violates Plaintiff’s rights to free speech and free association. Additionally, Plaintiff is entitled to a limited preliminary injunction for the same reasons as the plaintiffs in McDonald. View "Boudreaux v. LA State Bar Assoc" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs challenge the Louisiana Legislature’s 2022 redistricting map for electing the state’s six members of the United States House of Representatives. The district court preliminarily enjoined use of that map for the 2022 congressional elections. The United States Supreme Court stayed that injunction, pending resolution of a case involving Alabama’s congressional redistricting plan. About a year later, the Supreme Court resolved the Alabama case.In review of the Louisiana Legislature's 2022 redistricting plan, the Fifth Circuit held that district court did not clearly err in its necessary fact-findings nor commit legal error in its conclusions that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, the court found the injunction is no longer necessary. View "Robinson v. Ardoin" on Justia Law

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The Galveston County Commissioners Court is composed of four county commissioners, elected from single-member precincts, and one county judge, elected by the entire county. From 1991 to 2021, one of the four commissioner precincts had a majority-minority population, with blacks and Hispanics together accounting for 58 percent of the precinct’s total population as of 2020. In 2021, the Galveston County Commissioners Court enacted a new districting plan for county commissioner elections. The enacted plan does not contain a majority-minority precinct. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the enacted plan dilutes the voting power of the county’s black and Hispanic voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.Galveston County appealed. The panel held that, under existing precedent, distinct minority groups like blacks and Hispanics may be aggregated for purposes of vote dilution claims under Section 2. However, disagreeing with the underlying legal analysis, the panel believed that such precedent should be overturned. Thus, the panel requested a poll for en banc hearing. View "Petteway v. Galveston County" on Justia Law

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In April of 2022,the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,and Explosives (“ATF”)issued a Final Rule in which the terms “firearm” and “frame or receiver,” among others, were given “an updated, more comprehensive definition. The Final Rule was almost immediately the subject of litigation claiming that ATF had exceeded its statutory authority, including this case.The Plaintiffs claimed that portions of the Final Rule, which redefine “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The plaintiffs requested that the court hold unlawful and set aside the Final Rule, and that the court preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Government from enforcing or implementing the Final Rule. The district issued, and then expanded upon, a preliminary injunction before granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, vacating the Final Rule.The Fifth Circuit held that the two challenged portions of the Final Rule exceeded ATF's authority.At this point, all that remained before the court was whether the appeal of the district court’s final judgment vacating the Final Rule in its entirety. In reviewing the district court's vacatur of the entire Final Rule, the court vacated the vactur order, remanding for further consideration of the remedy, considering the court’s holding on the merits. View "VanDerStok v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Jane Doe AW, a former criminal clerk in the Burleson County Attorney’s Office, alleged that Burleson County Judge Mike Sutherland used his power and authority as a county judge to sexually assault her on several occasions. Doe claimed that Sutherland sexually assaulted her once in his restaurant, Funky Junky, LLC (“Funky Junky”), and twice in his office. According to Doe, when she complained to Sutherland about the abuse, she was terminated from her job. The district court entered final judgment, ordering that Doe take nothing against Burleson County. Doe timely appealed the judgment. Doe raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether Sutherland, as the Burleson County Judge, was a policymaker with final decision-making authority for Burleson County with respect to Doe’s claim; (2) whether the Magistrate Judge abused her discretion when she reversed and vacated a prior order on a dispositive motion; and (3) whether the Magistrate Judge erred in indicating that she would deny a party’s challenge for cause unless the parties agreed on the challenge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite his position as County Judge, Sutherland lacked the requisite policymaking authority to hold Burleson County liable for his alleged sexual misconduct. Monell requires that “the municipal official . . . possess final policymaking authority for the action in question.” The court wrote that even if the Texas constitutional provision gave Sutherland, as County Judge, broad ability to oversee operations in the county, this authority is immaterial because Doe fails to establish that Sutherland possessed the requisite authority as it relates specifically to the alleged sexual abuse. View "Doe AW v. Burleson County, TX" on Justia Law

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Using a blocked number, an anonymous individual twice called 9-1-1 in Abilene, Texas, relaying a serious threat of gun violence against officers and an alleged hostage while providing his location. Abilene Police responded, only to find the apartment occupied by Plaintiff and his dog, with no hostage or lethal firearm in sight. Plaintiff was detained, taken to the police station, and ultimately released when an investigation proved inconclusive. Weeks later, Plaintiff was charged with making a false report, though the charges were eventually dropped. Plaintiff subsequently sued three individuals involved in his arrest and prosecution as well as Taylor County, Texas. Each defendant moved for summary judgment, with the individuals asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the Defendants’ motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court’s order regarding the exclusion of the affidavits, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against the officer and detective, and the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against all Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s order regarding Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the officer. The court explained that the investigator is the only Taylor County employee involved in this suit, serving in the Taylor County District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff’s suit against Taylor County is, therefore, wholly premised on the investigator’s alleged wrongdoing. Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the investigator vitiates Plaintiff’s Monell claim. View "Reitz v. Woods" on Justia Law

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In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of juvenile molestation in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Section 14:81.2. Petitioner appealed of the denial of his Section 2254 petition challenging those convictions and his sentence—specifically, his claim on appeal that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient for a conviction on the last count.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court wrote that it did not find that the state court was objectively unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on Count III. The court explained that the evidence was clearly sufficient for a rational jury to find that the described acts were “lewd and lascivious”—and Petitioner’s alternative explanations do not disturb this conclusion. Petitioner’s counsel’s argument, for instance, that it can be normal for adults to “squeeze and pinch” a child’s behind under their clothes flies in the face of common sense. Petitioner provided examples of when such behavior might occur—such as when a child needs help with the restroom—are far afield of the facts before the court. Equally unavailing is counsel’s suggestion that acts must be painful in order to be obscene or indecent. Finally, Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that any molestation occurred in Louisiana as opposed to Mississippi. The court explained that the place of the crime is not an element of the offense of molestation of a juvenile under Louisiana law. View "Terry v. Hooper" on Justia Law

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In July 2021, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued an executive order that prohibited private individuals from providing ground transportation to migrants who were previously detained or subject to expulsion. The United States brought a lawsuit against Governor Abbott and the State of Texas, arguing that the executive order was preempted by federal law. Three nonprofit organizations and a retired lawyer also brought a Section 1983 suit against the Governor and the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). The defendants moved to dismiss the suit brought by the private plaintiffs, arguing in part that the plaintiffs lacked standing and the suit against the Governor was barred by sovereign immunity. The district court rejected these arguments, and Governor Abbott appealed.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Governor that sovereign immunity bars the lawsuit brought by the private plaintiffs. The court explained Section 411.012 does not imbue the Governor with the “particular duty to enforce” the Executive Order. Second, even if the Governor had a particular duty to enforce GA-37 by commandeering DPS, he has not “demonstrated [a] willingness to exercise that duty.” Third, the Governor’s enforcement directive to DPS should have been sufficient to remove the Governor from this suit. Fourth, the court explained that if Plaintiffs want to show that the Governor silently invoked Section 411.012 and implicitly commandeered a state agency, they must plead facts to support that inference. Thus, the court held that sovereign immunity bars the private Plaintiffs’ suit against the Governor. View "USA v. Abbott" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery, obstruction of commerce by robbery, and using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death. Defendant was charged alongside several others. The district court severed the trial of the then-capital defendants. Defendant’s first trial, in July 2021, ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict. At his retrial in March 2022, a jury convicted Defendant of each of the three counts charged. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it rejected Defendant’s assertion that his substantial rights were affected “because the government’s case was almost entirely premised on DNA evidence.” The court explained that the government also presented eyewitness testimony that, on the morning of the robbery, Defendant helped load a bag of firearms into the vehicle used in the robbery, and the government properly introduced a statement from a non-testifying co-defendant that Defendant was one of the shooters who emerged from the vehicle. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s vague assertion does not establish that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.” View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a Louisiana prisoner, sued the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole (“Parole Board”), seeking to have his parole reinstated on the grounds that its rescission just prior to its effective date violated his due process rights. The district court agreed with Plaintiff and ordered his release on parole within 30 days. On appeal, the Parole Board’s arguments include that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the State bases its argument on the premise that the Parole Board has unfettered discretion in all aspects of parole and release decisions. In support of its position, the State relied on an unpublished opinion, Burton v. Bd. of Parole. The court wrote that the opinion relies on Sinclair for its analysis, which the court has already rejected as inapplicable in this case. The court concluded the same now with regard to Burton because, there, the Louisiana First Circuit was considering an appeal from a prisoner’s denial of parole. The opinion discusses “expectancy of release,” while the question here is whether there are limits on the Parole Board to rescind parole after its formal grant but before the effective date of release. The court agreed and explained that Plaintiff’s parole was ostensibly rescinded because of an alleged problem with notice to a victim. He was notified of this reason on May 1, 2017, 10 days after his parole was rescinded. At the time, that was not a permissible reason to rescind his grant of parole. Therefore, Plaintiff’s parole was improperly rescinded. View "Galbraith v. Hooper" on Justia Law