Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possession with intent to distribute and to possession with intent to distribute marijuana - not cocaine. The cover sheet of his presentence report (PSR) erroneously listed his offense as conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of, cocaine, and so did his judgment. Thirteen years after the entry of judgment, defendant filed a pro se motion with the district court under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The district court corrected the judgment, but refused to correct the misstatement on the PSR. The court concluded that the PSR is a "part of the record" within the meaning of Rule 36. Further, the court concluded that the error was not harmless because it affected defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Mackay" on Justia Law

Defendants Rodriquez-Lopez and Barron appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Defendants raised a number of issues on appeal. The court concluded that a rational jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Texas; the evidence was sufficient to convict Rodriquez-Lopez; and Rodriquez-Lopez's sentence did not violate United States v. Booker. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict Barron. Although the court agreed with Barron that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were improper, the comments did not prejudice Barron. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in applying a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) for Barron's managerial or supervisory role in the drug conspiracy. Accordingly, the court vacated Barron's sentence as to Count One and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of a certificate of appealability (COA) for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner had raised a presumption of vindictiveness claim, any such argument was foreclosed by the court's binding precedent in Delony v. Estelle. The court denied a COA on the prosecutorial vindictiveness claim and the ineffective assistance of counsel claims where petitioner could not demonstrate prejudice. View "Jordan v. Epps" on Justia Law

This case concerns the district court's decision to revisit a school desegregation case in which the last order prior to 2009 was entered in 1974. The school board appealed the dismissal of its motion to dismiss the desegregation case, which was originally filed in 1965. The court concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The court also concluded that Board of Education of Oklahoma City of Public Schools v. Dowell requires the conclusion that the 1974 Order is ambiguous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings View "Thomas, et al. v. St. Martin Parish" on Justia Law

The Insureds filed suit against Mid-Continent alleging that it failed in its obligation to defend them when it refused to pay the fees of the Insureds' chosen attorney who represented them in an underlying lawsuit brought against them by KFA. On appeal, the Insureds challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mid-Continent. The court concluded that the district court did not err because no disqualifying conflict of interest existed under Texas law, and Mid-Continent fulfilled its duty to defend the Insureds by tendering its chosen attorney. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Partain, et al. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The principal issue in this case was whether, after an automatic stay in bankruptcy has been lifted and a creditor was permitted to foreclose on real property, federal or state law governed an oversecured creditor's recovery of attorneys' and other fees from the sale proceeds. A corollary issue was whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the sale proceedings for purposes of determining the creditor's right to recover attorneys' fees and the Deed of Trust trustee's right to recover a contractually specified commission for conducting the non-judicial foreclosure sale. The bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction but the district court reversed. The court reversed, concluding that federal law governs what is to be distributed to a secured claimant that is oversecured. The court discerned no intent from 11 U.S.C. 506(b) that oversecured creditors who are permitted to foreclose are to be treated differently from oversecured creditors whose claims are satisfied within the bankruptcy proceeding. In this instance, the bankruptcy court's order lifting the stay allowed Wells Fargo to foreclose on the property in accordance with state law foreclosure procedures. It did not give the Deed of Trust any further authority and did not have the effect of insulating the debtor or any of the creditors from the reach of section 506(b). Lifting the automatic stay to allow Wells Fargo to foreclose was not tantamount to an abandonment of the property. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court was within its discretion in finding that there was no documentation of the time that was spent and no testimony as to what was a reasonable fee. Based on this record, the court could not say that the bankruptcy court erred in finding under section 506(b) that the amount of attorneys' fees Wells Fargo sought was not substantiated and therefore was not shown to be reasonable. Even under Texas law, Wells Fargo would bear the burden of demonstrating that the fees it requested were reasonable. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al. v. 804 Congress, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming denial of medical insurance, Medicare premiums, and deductible reimbursements. The district court held that the pension plan benefit plan was a "governmental plan" exempt from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., and granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district court employed the wrong procedural mechanism for analyzing this case. Because a federal district court has jurisdiction to decide whether or not a plan is an ERISA plan as claimed by plaintiffs, the court concluded that, under Supreme Court precedent and ACS Recovery Services, Inc. v. Griffin, the proper procedural vehicle to raise the question of whether a purported ERISA plan is a "governmental plan" is either Rule 12(b)(6) or, if factual information outside the pleadings is needed, Rule 56. View "Smith, et al. v. Regional Transit Auth., et al." on Justia Law

Anticipating that W&T, an energy exploration and development company, would seek recovery for its Removal of Debris (ROD) expenses as a result of Hurricane Ike under its Umbrella Policies, Underwriters sought a declaratory judgment that they were not liable for W&T's ROD damages. Because W&T's underlying insurance was admittedly exhausted by claims not covered by the Umbrella Policies, the insurers argued that they have no liability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Underwriters, holding that the plain terms of the Umbrella Policies stated that it only takes effect if the underlying policies were exhausted by claims that would be covered under the Umbrella Policies themselves. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that a careful reading of the contract unambiguously precluded Underwriters' interpretation. W&T's interpretation fits neatly with (1) the plain text of the Coverage provision, (2) the definition of a Retained Limit, and (3) other contract provisions relating to coverage and payment. View "Indemnity Ins. Co., et al. v. W & T Offshore, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a large Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., provider, sought a declaration that defendants, three independent, non-ERISA insurance providers, were bound by the terms of the ERISA plan and primarily liable for injuries sustained by individuals covered by the parties. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the Central States have failed to state a claim for equitable relief as required by Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA; there was no gap in ERISA's enforcement scheme requiring a federal common law claim for unjust enrichment; and Count I does not adequately state a claim for equitable relief under ERISA 502. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Central States, SE and SW Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Health Special Risk, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting bank robbery. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction, sentence, and various rulings by the district court. The court concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his interrogation video where his confession was knowing and voluntary; the court rejected defendant's allegation that an off-the-record conversation occurred "in open court" between the government and the district court where the government stated that it would indict Teddy Rogers, who the government did not charge with aiding and abetting bank robbery, if he testified for the defense where there was no causal nexus between the alleged government action and Roger's decision to not testify; the court addressed defendant's evidentiary challenges and rejected them on the merits; the prosecutor's improper comment does not necessitate reversal of defendant's conviction; and the cumulative error doctrine was inapplicable in this case. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law