Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of her claim of sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court ruled that plaintiff, a volunteer firefighter, was not an "employee" within the meaning of Title VII. The court concluded that plaintiff was not an "employee" for purposes of Title VII because she failed to make a threshold showing of remuneration. Plaintiff's benefits were purely incidental to her volunteer services with District 5. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5" on Justia Law

The EEOC sued Houston Funding, alleging that Houston Funding unlawfully discharged one of its employees because she was lactating and wanted to express milk at work. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Houston Funding, finding that, as a matter of law, discharging a female employee because she was lactating or expressing milk did not constitute sex discrimination. However, given the court's precedent, the court held that the EEOC's argument that Houston Funding discharged the employee because she was lactating or expressing milk stated a cognizable sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. An adverse employment action motivated by these factors clearly imposed upon women a burden that male employees need not - indeed, could not - suffer. Moreover, the court held that lactation was a related medical condition of pregnancy for purposes of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(k). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Houston Funding II, et al." on Justia Law

Debtor's Chapter 13 case was converted to Chapter 11 after a creditor filed a claim that caused his scheduled debts to exceed the debt ceiling for Chapter 13 cases. The denial of confirmation of debtor's organization plan was certified for appeal from the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). At issue on appeal was whether Chapter 11's absolute priority rule, 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(B), as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, applied in such individual debtor cases. Using standard tools of statutory interpretation, and in accord with two other circuits, the court held that it did and affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying confirmation. View "In the Matter of Philip Lively" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a civil rights action against defendants seeking damages for injuries suffered as a result of their nine-month imprisonment. Plaintiffs were arrested for murder and the charges against them were eventually dropped. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on the false arrest claim in favor of Defendants Brooks and McNeal, the grant of summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim in favor of Brooks, and the denial of their motion for leave to amend. Because the district court did not certify as a final judgment its initial order dismissing the claims against Lamar County with prejudice, Lamar County was still a party to the suit at the time plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint. The district court thus abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. The district court did not, however, abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add Defendant Keele to the litigation. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's orders granting summary judgment to defendants. View "Crostley, et al. v. Lamar County, TX, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for mail fraud, arguing that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161-3174. Defendant directed the Governor's Program on Abstinence, a state-funded organization formed to facilitate abstinence education in Louisiana schools. Defendant was accused and later convicted of orchestrating a scheme to fraudulently direct state funds to her son. Because the court concluded that the delays prompted by defense counsel's motions to continue, and by the parties' joint notice of intent to enter a guilty plea, were properly excludable under the Act, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Dignam" on Justia Law

KEC appealed from the district court's order denying its motion for a declaration and specific performance of the obligations of BorgWarner under the Master Settlement Agreement, the Merger Agreement, and the Cooperation Agreement. This case arose when plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that KEC, BorgWarner, and others improperly disposed and negligently disposed of substances containing toxic chemicals at the Crystal Springs site, where KEC owned a facility manufacturing transformers, and such negligence resulted in injuries to plaintiffs. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the terms of the Merger Agreement and Cooperation Agreement were not incorporated into the Master Settlement Agreement, and BorgWarner fulfilled its obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement. View "Alford, et al v. Kuhlman Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of capital murder of a nine-year-old and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of her petition for habeas relief. Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability (COA) so that she could appeal on three grounds: first, her legal team failed to investigate facts relevant to her conviction for capital murder; second, her legal team failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence, and third, she was incarcerated for an offense of which she was actually innocent. Because jurists of reason would not disagree with or find debatable the district court's rejection of her claims, the court denied her request for a COA. View "Coleman v. Thaler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, currently serving life sentences in Louisiana, repeatedly sought to have his sentences commuted in order to become eligible for parole. After he was first convicted, Louisiana altered its commutation process. This appeal concerned plaintiff's complaint that the application of the new process to him violated the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Because the ultimate decision of the Louisiana governor as to whether to grant or deny commutation remained entirely discretionary, plaintiff could not establish an ex post facto violation by identifying alterations to the State's commutation procedure increasing the amount of time between when commutation applications could be filed and granting the Board authority to deny a full hearing on an applicant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Howard v. Blanco, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was operating in the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (ICW) under its contract with the Corp when it was struck by a passing vessel. This admiralty appeal challenged the district court's finding of liability arising from the allision in the ICW. The court agreed with the district court and held that plaintiff violated Inland Navigation Rule 9 (INR 9) by mooring in a narrow channel; and that the violation triggered the rule of The Pennsylvania, shifting the burden of proving causation to the dredge. Because plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of causation by demonstrating that the dredge was not a cause of the allision, the court affirmed the district court's judgment holding plaintiff partially liable. The court found that the district court committed no error in finding plaintiff 70 percent liable and thus affirmed the allocation of fault. View "Mike Hooks Dredging Co., Inc. v. Eckstein Marine Serv., Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this gender discrimination suit against LSU, alleging that the LSU Police Department violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., as well as Louisiana state employment law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:332(A)(1), 23:967, by failing to promote her to the position of Chief of Police and retaliating against her for filing complaints with the EEOC and LCHR. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of LSU because plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination and there was a genuine disputed issue of fact of whether LSU's alleged non-discriminatory reason for not promoting plaintiff was pretextual. Accordingly, summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim was improper. Plaintiff had also shown a conflict in substantial evidence regarding retaliation and, therefore, summary judgment was improper on that second claim. View "Haire v. Board of Supervisors of LA State University" on Justia Law