Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to lying about his U.S. citizenship on a Firearms Transaction Record form which he completed while attempting to purchase a handgun. Defendant also pled guilty to illegal re-entry to the United States after deportation following a conviction for an aggravated felony. Defendant appealed the district court's decision on his ineffective counsel claim where defendant claimed counsel failed to independently research and investigate the derivative citizenship defense. The court concluded that defendant's guilty pleas were not entered knowingly or voluntarily because counsel advised him without investigating derivative citizenship. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioners appealed the Tax Court's order dismissing their action against the Government for lack of jurisdiction. At issue on appeal was whether the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction where petitioners failed to file their petition within the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act's (TEFRA), 26 U.S.C. 6226(a)-(b), express filing period. Because the court held that section 6226's 150-day limit was jurisdictional, the court had no authority to alter it. The plain language of the statue measured the 150-day filing period from the date the IRS mailed the final partnership administrative adjustments (FPAA) and it did not contemplate tolling. Petitioners filed the present petition 418 days after the FPAA was mailed, - over 250 days late. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted and pleaded guilty, without a written plea agreement, to receipt of child pornography. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that he was entitled to a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(1) because he distributed no material involving the exploitation of a minor. Because the district court did not err by declining to apply the two-level reduction where defendant's conduct was not limited to that of a mere viewer of child pornography, nor was his conduct casual or isolated, the court affirmed the sentence.

This case arose when claimant served plaintiff with a complaint, alleging that his injuries were caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V St. Andrew and by the negligence of plaintiff and its employees. Claimant became entangled in a line and was pulled into a mooring bit, seriously injuring his left leg. Following a state court trial, claimant won a judgment in excess of $750,000 and plaintiff subsequently appealed. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of its limitation act as untimely. Because a challenge to the timeliness of a limitation action was a challenge to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and because plaintiff had notice claimant was mounting such a challenge in his motion to dismiss, the district court did not err by construing plaintiff's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the six-month deadline was triggered when claimant delivered his complaint to plaintiff on April 28, 2009, and that plaintiff's January 18, 2010 petition was untimely filed. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it opted not to hold an evidentiary hearing on claimant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Christopher M. Loften died from a rare disease called Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN) after taking Motrin. Lofton's wife and children brought suit against defendants asserting that Motrin caused the disease and defendants had failed to warn consumers about the risk of these severe autoimmune allergic reactions. At issue on appeal was whether the district court correctly found that federal law preempted Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 82.007(b)(1), which required plaintiffs to assert, in failure to warn cases, that a drug manufacturer withheld or misrepresented material information to the FDA. The court held that section 82.007(b)(1) required a Texas plaintiff to prove fraud-on-the-FDA to recover for failure to warn and this requirement invoked federal law supremacy. Therefore, because the court concluded that section 82.007(b)(1) was a fraud-on-the-FDA provision analogous to the claim considered in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., the court held that it was preempted by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., unless the FDA itself found fraud. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The parents of a National Guardsman killed in an electrocution accident in Iraq brought suit against a civilian contractor who they claimed was responsible. Plaintiffs argued that Iraqi law governed the limitations period within which the suit needed to be brought but the district court held both that Iraqi law was not sufficiently proven and that the claims were barred by Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period. The court reversed and remanded, determining that Iraqi law was sufficiently proven. By operation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 3549, the Iraqi three-year prescription period applied. Based on what had been introduced, that period did not expire prior to suit and CPA Order 17 did not prevent this suit. Whether parents were proper parties, and any other issues beyond what the court had identified, were for further reconsideration on remand.

This case arose when Ford sent a cease-and-desist letter to NBFP, demanding that NBFP pay damages and refrain from using Ford's trademarks on its websites. NBFP sued Ford in Texas state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that its online printing operations did not infringe Ford's trademark rights. NBFP subsequently appealed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment for Ford; the district court's final judgment holding NBFP liable for trademark infringement; and the district court's order denying NBFP's motion to amend its complaint. Ford cross-appealed from the district court's final judgment, disputing that court's findings on infringement, dilution, and attorney's fees. The court held that the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to Ford was affirmed. Because there was no likely threat of consumer confusion as to NBFP's sale of products bearing the Ford marks to three independent used car dealers, the court reversed the district court's judgment finding that NBFP's sale of these products amounted to trademark infringement, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for NBFP on this category of products. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects.

Appellants appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TBS. The appeal concerned the construction and application of the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (LOWLA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:4861, et seq., on an issue of first impression. The court concluded that the district court authored a thorough and well-reasoned opinion concerning the substantive issues presented and affirmed the judgment. The district court had concluded that by providing survey and positioning services in Vermilion Block 313 in order to help remove a platform following well depletion, TBS performed "operations" under LOWLA. The work that TBS did was both "on a well site" and involved "abandoning a well" within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, the lien that TBS had asserted was valid and enforceable.

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Ruddy Elizondo, appealed from two separate district court orders granting summary judgment to Officer W.M. Green and the City of Garland, Texas, on their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 that Green used excessive force against Ruddy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Green's use of deadly force was not clearly unreasonable when Ruddy ignored repeated instructions to put down the knife he was holding and seemed intent on provoking Green; at the time Green discharged his weapon, Ruddy was hostile, armed with a knife, in close proximity to Green, and moving closer; and in considering the totality of the circumstances in which Green found himself, it was reasonable for him to conclude that Ruddy posed a threat of serious harm. Finally, in the absence of a constitutional violation, there was no municipal liability for the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement to being illegally present in the United States after being deported. Over defendant's objection, the district court increased his base offense level of eight by 16 levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), on the theory that his 2009 conviction for sexual activity with a minor in violation of Florida Statute 794.05 was a "crime of violence." Defendant timely appealed. Because defendant did not adequately preserve his objection to the sentence, plain error review applied. The court held that although "plain error" occurred, the court was not compelled to reverse under the circumstances because the applicable state court records, coupled with defense counsel's admission that the victim was fourteen, established either the victim's status as a minor or the inequity, under the fourth prong of clear error review, of the court reaching out on appeal to correct the plain error.