Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner pled guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to death. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief from the Texas courts, alleging that he was mentally retarded, and his execution would therefore be unconstitutional. The Texas trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that petitioner was not mentally retarded. Petitioner subsequently applied for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and the federal district court denied relief. The court held that the state's legal conclusions neither contradicted nor unreasonably applied federal law, nor were its factual conclusions unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief.

Plaintiff sued the DoD for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the DoD violated various in-sourcing procedures adopted pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed, concluding exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint constituted an action by an interested party alleging a violation of a statute or regulation in connection with a procurement. Accordingly, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b), conferred exclusive jurisdiction over this action with the Court of Federal Claims and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not waive sovereign immunity as to plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint and the judgment was affirmed.

SLM appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of IFIC, a surety, against SLM, the principal on a bond pursuant to which IFIC paid Customs import duties assessed against SLM. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate IFIC's claims against SLM; exclusive jurisdiction over these claims did not lie in the Court of International Trade (CIT). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss or abate IFIC's action until the proceedings in the CIT have concluded. With regard to the merits of IFIC's claims against SLM, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of IFIC, concluding that SLM was required to pay IFIC the amounts that IFIC had paid to Customs pursuant to its bond obligations.

The United States appealed the district court's dismissal of a superseding indictment because it did not state a crime against defendant for knowingly and willfully making false statements to a financial institution insured by the FDIC and knowingly making false statements for the purpose of influencing the action of a bank insured by the FDIC. Defendant made the allegedly false statements on loan applications to refinance his residence where he failed to list an illegal campaign loan under "outstanding debts." The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that defendant's statements were literally true because the illegal loan was an absolute nullity and consequently was not a debt that ever existed.

Petitioner raised 21 separate challenges to his death sentence in a habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief and petitioner sought a certificate of appealability based on his claim under Atkins v. Virginia that his mental retardation barred his execution and based on various claims that the jury instructions at his punishment-phase trial violated the Eighth Amendment. In regards to the Atkins-related issues, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing nor err by using IQ scores to assess petitioner's general intellectual functioning; that the proper focus now was upon the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' (CCA) determination of petitioner's general intellectual functioning, a determination entitled to section 2254 deference; and that, in any event, any error would be harmless because petitioner did not challenge the district court's determinations that he had failed to satisfy the other two elements of the test for mental retardation. The court also rejected petitioner's remaining claims as foreclosed by circuit precedent. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for a certificate of appealability.

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and plaintiff appealed. The court held that because plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning the employer's proffered reason for firing her, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a trial on the merits.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claims against defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful termination. The court held that UTMB was entitled to immunity from suit where plaintiff conceded that UTMB was a state agency and failed to argue that Texas had consented to suit, nor had Congress expressly waived sovereign immunity from section 1983 suits. The court also held that, putting aside plaintiff's purported property interest in his employment, plaintiff failed to identify a genuine dispute that his termination was arbitrary or capricious, or that the decision was made without professional judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

After pleading guilty to bank fraud, C.K.'s supervised release was revoked, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4246(a)-(d), she was committed to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue was whether sufficient, accurate facts warranted revocation of the conditional discharge for medical treatment of C.K. The court held that revocation was proper because the provisions of section 4246(f) were adhered to where the district court held a hearing, at which time two expert forensic psychologists testified, and where the district court made a present determination that in light of C.K.'s failure to comply with her treatment regimen, her continued release would create a substantial risk of harm to others.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for appellees (GNOFCU and Cumis). The district court found that GNOFCU did not violate either the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. 1790b, or La. Rev. State. Ann. 23:967(A), by terminating plaintiff's employment after she complained of possible fraud in the company's lending practices. Because the court found that the district court minimized key evidence in finding no causal link between plaintiff's termination, demotion, and pay decrease, and her National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) complaints, and because section 23:967 seemed to offer broader protections than its federal counterpart, the court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants Lance Bennett, Dalton Bennett, and Danquell Miller were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack) and various other crimes. Defendants appealed the district court's determination that two of their peremptory challenges were improperly based on race. Defendants also challenged their convictions and sentences on various grounds to their individual cases. The court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited a black defendant from using a peremptory challenge to strike a white prospective juror because of that juror's race and affirmed the district court's determination that defendants struck the two jurors at issue for racially motivated reasons. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying Dalton's, Lance's, and Miller's motions for acquittal or a new trial. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Lance and Miller. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences were affirmed.