Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Qureshis were originally granted asylum from Pakistan because of Mr. Qureshi's support for the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), but the USCIS later decided to terminate the Qureshis' asylum based on that same support, applying the "persecutor bar" to Mr. Qureshi. The Qureshis sued USCIS to challenge its application of the bar and the district court granted USCIS's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the termination was not a final agency action. The court affirmed because it agreed that termination of asylum did not consummate agency action and thus was not final.

Plaintiffs sought to reopen a judgment entered in 2001 after the district judge that entered judgment for defendants in plaintiffs' person injury case was impeached and removed from office. Plaintiffs filed what they termed an independent action in equity on grounds that the judgment was procured by fraud involving the district judge. A new district judge dismissed the suit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court reversed and remanded after applying a five-element analysis of an independent action in equity.

This appeal involved a putative class action brought against several oil and gas companies and several companies that provide labor for offshore oil and gas projects. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants maintained a hiring scheme to employ foreign workers on the Outer Continental Shelf in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. The district court disposed of all plaintiffs' claims and then entered final judgment dismissing all claims. The court held that the Service Defendants did not violate RICO because the law that would make their conduct racketeering activity did not apply in the place where that conduct occurred, namely vessels floating on the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the exemptions the Service Defendants possessed to the OCSLA manning requirements did not shield them from RICO liability because those exemptions were fraudulently obtained. The court also held that plaintiffs could not state a claim for a private right of action for damages under the OCSLA and the district court's dismissal was proper. The court further held that the district court did not err in disposing plaintiffs' OCSLA enforcement claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This appeal arose out of an oil spill on the Neches River. Appellants challenged the National Pollution Funds Center's (NPFC) final claim determination denying reimbursement for costs arising from the spill. The district court rejected appellants' challenge to the agency determination. The court concluded that the NPFC's interpretation of 33 U.S.C. 2703 was entitled to deference and that appellants have not demonstrated that the NPFC's denial of the third-party affirmative defense claim should be overturned under the standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.

Amerisure appealed the district court's summary judgment ruling determining that Louisiana law prohibited the consideration of extrinsic evidence to prove mutual mistake; ranking Amerisure as the primary insurer; and allowing another third-party insurer to bring a cross-claim for defense fees. The court held that because the district court erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence to prove the theory of mutual mistake, the court reversed and remanded without considering ranking or standing.

Plaintiffs filed a civil action against St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Rodney Strain and Deputies Bryan Steinert, Julie Boynton, and Wayne Wicker, each in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence under Louisiana state law and for deliberate indifference based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The only three issues to survive summary judgment were the state-law negligence claims and the section 1983 claims against Steinert in his personal capacity and Strain in his official capacity. At issue were the two section 1983 claims. The court dismissed Steinert's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because he challenged the district court's factual conclusions on interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed Strain's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Strain was being sued in his official capacity, the suit against him was "in essence" a suit against a municipality, and municipal governments could not raise immunity defenses on interlocutory appeal.

Defendant and his nephew appealed their convictions following a jury trial. The nephew was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon and defendant was convicted of making and using a false document that was presented to a federal agent and of obstruction of justice. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence on the false document charge. The nephew challenged the jury instruction on constructive possession and also brought a foreclosed issue as to his sentence. The court held that because the statements defendant made were themselves charged as criminal conduct, they were properly admitted as the key evidence on the counts of making false statements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant knew the affidavit he helped an inmate prepare was false where the "knowledge of falsity" issue came down to a credibility question which was for the jury to resolve. The court further held that no reversible error was committed by including the constructive-possession instruction. The court finally held that the nephew's challenge to his sentencing enhancements was foreclosed and therefore, the court affirmed his sentence.

Petitioner, a native of Jamaica, petitioned for review of a removal order of the BIA. After he pled guilty of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute in Georgia, DHS charged petitioner with being removable for this crime, which it contended should be considered a felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and an "aggravated felony" under immigration law. The IJ agreed, and on appeal, the BIA endorsed the felony classification and dismissed petitioner's appeal. The court adopted the First and Sixth Circuits' approach that the default punishment under 21 U.S.C. 841 was a felony. Consequently, as was true for federal defendants charged under section 841, petitioner's crime was equivalent to a federal felony where petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he was convicted of only misdemeanor conduct. Petitioner's other arguments were without merit. Therefore, the petition for review was denied.

Plaintiff's lawsuit arose from defendant's refusal to pay some or all of plaintiff's claims for reimbursement for medical-device procurement and financing services provided in connection with over 2,000 patients insured under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., plans administered by defendant. Plaintiff subsequently appealed a summary judgment for defendant. At issue was whether plaintiff's state-law claims of promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code, 541.051(A) & (B) and 541.061(1) & (2), were preempted by ERISA. The court reversed with respect to plaintiff's promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and Texas Insurance Code claims because these claims were premised on allegations and evidence that plaintiff provided the services in reliance on defendant's representations that it would pay reasonable charges for plaintiff's services. The court affirmed with respect to plaintiff's quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims because these claims depended on plaintiff's assertion that without its services the patients' ERISA plans would have obligated defendant to reimburse a different provider for the same services.

Defendant appealed his jury conviction for attempting to distribute over 1000 kilograms of marijuana based on insufficient evidence. The court held that, looking at the evidence presented to the jury and the inferences they could draw, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the verdict.