Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This litigation arose out of a contract between the parties in which PDNED agreed to transfer its rights to LHC to purchase shopping mall property from a third party. LHC alleged that, based on representations made by PDNED, LHC expected to lease the property to Lowe's Home Improvement. PDNED subsequently appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of LHC. As a preliminary matter, the court held that it need not resolve the choice-of-law question where the parties agreed that, with a few exceptions, no material differences existed between New Hampshire and Texas law with regard to the case and the court's conclusions would be the same under either state's law. The court held that the purchase and sale agreement (P&S Agreement) precluded LHC's promissory estoppel claim because the agreement itself controlled the extent of PDNED's binding promises with regard to the purchase and sale of the property. The court also held that the district court did not err when it denied PDNED's motion to dismiss LHC's negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations claims as a matter of law where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support finding PDNED liable for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations. The court also held that the jury's out-of-pocket award was the appropriate measure to compensate LHC for reliance costs but that lost profits were not an appropriate measure of damages for the fraudulent misrepresentations in this case. The court finally held that PDNED could not be considered the prevailing party in this litigation for purposes of the P&S Agreement's attorneys' fees provision. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment against PDNED on LHC's promissory estoppel claim and the jury's award in lost profits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and the jury's award of out-of-pocket damages and the denial of PDNED's motion for attorney's fees.

Appellant sought to intervene in a suit under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, that was originally filed in 1996 by the League of United Latin American Citizens, District 19 (LULAC), against the city of Boerne, Texas. LULAC and the city reached a settlement agreement in 1996 and the district court entered a consent decree which provided that city council members would thereafter be elected through at-large elections with cumulative voting. In 2009, LULAC and the city filed a joint motion to reopen the case and modify the consent decree in order to switch to a single-member-district system. The district court granted that motion and appellant, a resident and registered voter of Boerne who opposed the change, filed a motion to intervene. Appellant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion on the grounds that appellant lacked standing. The court held that appellant had standing; that the case was not moot; and appellant had a right to intervene in the case under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of appellant's motion to intervene. The court also held that the district court had the power to modify the consent decree; but the district court abused its discretion in granting LULAC and the city's motion to modify because the record did not show that modifications were warranted. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the district court's order granting the modified consent decree.

Defendant, the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), was found liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating plaintiff's constitutional rights by unlawfully incarcerating him for fifteen months beyond the expiration of his sentence. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial. The court held that because defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where no reasonable jury could have found that defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs, four former elementary-school students, sued the school district because school officials have, at various times and in various ways, prevented them from evangelizing while at school. At issue was whether the school principals violated clearly established law when they restricted plaintiffs from distributing written religious materials while at school. The court held that the principals were entitled to qualified immunity because clearly established law did not put the constitutionality of their actions beyond debate. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with an instruction to dismiss plaintiffs' claims as to the principals in their individual capacities.

Defendant was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress a firearm uncovered during a warrantless automobile search by a trooper. The court held that because the trooper unconstitutionally prolonged defendant's detention by asking irrelevant and unrelated questions without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of conviction, remanding the case for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

Plaintiff sued his former employer under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq., to recover profit sharing and retirement benefits that were allegedly withheld from him. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on his claims that the employer breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty and violated ERISA's disclosure requirements. The district court also awarded plaintiff statutory penalties and attorney's fees. The court affirmed the district court's award of damages for breach of fiduciary duty and attorney's fees. The court held, however, that the summary allocation report contained no information about how a participant could elect to receive a rollover distribution, nor did it inform the participant of her rights under the profit-sharing plan. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for additional findings on whether the employer failed to furnish plaintiff with the requisite documents under ERISA 104(b)(1), and if so, whether that omission served as a basis for statutory penalties.

This was an antitrust case involving a dispute between competing programs to sell vouchers for rounds of golf at golf courses along Mississippi's Gulf Coast. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, deciding, in pertinent part, that plaintiff had failed to allege the interstate commerce element of a valid claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. The court concluded that, if it was true that these hotels and golf courses attracted out-of-state visitors who participated in the voucher program, as the complaint alleged, then there could be no doubt under both the Supreme Court's and this court's jurisprudence that the complaint stated a claim with respect to subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, because the court found that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Following his conviction for a meth-related offense, defendant exhausted his state remedies on claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive conflict-free counsel or an impartial jury. The federal magistrate judge, however, conducted its own evidentiary hearing and granted the writ. Based on its review of the state court proceedings alone, the court reversed. The court held that in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, the district court erred in allowing an evidentiary hearing under section 2254(e)(2). With the evidence properly confined to the record before the state courts, the court reversed the grant of habeas relief.

This appeal arose from the settlement of a class action where defendant paid substantial sums for res judicata protection from the claims of persons assertedly injured by the toxic emissions of an industrial plant. The monies were allocated among three subclasses, one of which was to receive medical monitoring. Upon the monitoring program's completion, substantial sums remained unused. The district court denied the settlement administrator's request to distribute the unused medical-monitoring funds to another subclass of persons suffering serious injuries. Instead, the district court repaired to the doctrine of cy pres and ordered that the money be given to three charities suggested by defendant and one selected by the district court. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a cy pres distribution in the teeth of the bargained-for-terms of the settlement agreement, which required residual funds to be distributed within the class. The court reversed the district court's order distributing the unused medical-monitoring funds to third-party charities and remanded with instructions that the district court order that the funds be distributed to the subclass comprising the most seriously injured class members.

This case stemmed from FEMA's determination that the Holy Cross School was eligible for public assistance funds to construct a new school campus on the site of Cabrini Church and Cabrini School in Gentilly to replace its old campus six miles away in the Lower Ninth Ward. Friends of Cabrini Church filed a complaint against FEMA, alleging that, inter alia, the section 106 review process, which defined the "area of potential effects" (APE), C.F.R. 800.4(a), 800.16(d), was deficient. On appeal, Friends of Cabrini Church subsequently challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FEMA. The court held that because Friends of Cabrini Church lacked standing to bring its claims, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.