Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and kidnapping in Mississippi and sentenced to death and twenty years in prison, respectively. The district court subsequently granted habeas relief with respect to the sentencing phase of the trial, ruling that the sentencing instructions incorrectly informed the jurors that defendant would be eligible for parole in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court agreed with the district court that the erroneous sentencing instructions violated defendant's due process rights and that the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling that the error was harmless was unreasonable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of relief with respect to defendant's sentence and affirmed the district court's resentencing order.

Defendant appealed his sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At issue was whether the district court erred in fashioning an above-Guidelines sentence based in part on his record of prior arrests. The court held that it was error for the district court to consider defendant's prior arrests at sentencing and that the court was uncertain as to whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent consideration of the arrests. Because the burden fell on the proponent of the sentence to convincingly demonstrate that the sentence would have been the same, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

This suit arose out of a dispute between a ship repair contractor, barge owner, and insurance company over the terms of a ship repair service contract and a maritime insurance policy. The contractor appealed from the district court's ruling that that the contractor breached its contractual obligation to procure insurance coverage for the barge owner and that it was contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the barge owner against damages ensuing from a workplace injury that occurred while the barge was being repaired. The barge owner cross-appealed from the district court's ruling that it was not entitled to additional insured coverage under the contractor's insurance policy. The court affirmed the district court's holding that there was a written agreement between the contractor and the barge owner which obligated the contractor to defend, indemnify, and procure insurance for the barge owner. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the barge owner, which was not named in the policy, was not an additional insured under the policy. The court held, however, that the district court made no ruling regarding attorney's fees and therefore, the court remanded to the district court for a determination of the barge owner's entitlement, if any, to attorney's fees.

Defendant was convicted for making and subscribing to a false tax return and multiple counts of conspiracy, mail fraud, and securities fraud. Defendant appealed his sentence on the following four grounds: (1) the application of the 2001 version of the Sentencing Guidelines to his case violated the ex post facto clause; (2) the district court used improper methodology in computing the amount of loss under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1); (3) the district court committed plain error in applying the U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) leader/organizer enhancement; and (4) the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court held that it was not plain error for the district court to apply the 2001 Sentencing Guidelines; the district court correctly calculated the amount of loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1; the district court did not commit plain error in applying the leader/organizer four-level enhancement; and the sentencing court imposed a substantively reasonable sentence and did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP); Countrywide Home Loans of Texas, Incorporated; and Countrywide Home Loans, Incorporated appealed an order for remand where the district court dismissed the lone federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667f, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Defendants argued that this was an abuse of discretion because Countrywide Home Loans of Texas was improperly joined and thus the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiffs argued that there was no improper joinder and that defendants waived any right to argue improper joinder or the existence of diversity jurisdiction when they failed to remove the action to federal court within 30 days of service of the original complaint that listed Countrywide Home Loans of Texas. The court held that defendants carried their burden of proving improper joinder; the district court had jurisdiction over the state law claims at the time of remand; and the exercise of that jurisdiction was mandatory. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision to remand the state law claims to Texas state court and remanded for further proceedings.

These three closely related appeals arose out of two district court cases, each involving a different tract of land owned by the Avoyelles Parish School Board (School Board), where neither tract was accessible by public road and both shared borders with the Lake Ophelia Wildlife Refuge (Refuge), which was owned by the United States Department of Interior (Department). The School Board filed these suits against all adjoining landowners, including the Department, to fix the School Board's legal rights of passage to the respective enclosed lands. The district court fixed rights of passage that burdened Refuge lands and concluded that the Department could not impose certain desired restrictions on the School Board's actions on Refuge lands. On appeal, the court reversed both judgments in full and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when the SEC brought suit against Stanford Group Company (SGC), along with various other Stanford entities, including Stanford International Bank (SIB), for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. In this interlocutory appeal, defendants appealed the preliminary injunction that the receiver subsequently obtained against numerous former financial advisors and employees of SGC, freezing the accounts of those individuals pending the outcome of trial. The court held that the district court had the power to decide the motion for preliminary injunction before deciding the motion to compel arbitration; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction; the preliminary injunction was not overbroad; and the district court acted within its power to grant a Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 24.005(a)(1), injunction rather than an attachment; and that the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded the motion to compel arbitration for a ruling in the first instance.

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm where the government presented evidence at trial that he sold two firearms to a named individual. Shortly after sentencing, defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence that his brother was the individual who sold the firearms and the district court granted a new trial. The government subsequently appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it held that defendant satisfied all five Berry factors when he proffered testimony of one of his other brothers and granted defendant's motion for a new trial.

This case arose when elderly widow Dorothy Chase Stewart filed for bankruptcy in 2007 and Wells Fargo Bank filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court reciting debts owed from an outstanding mortgage on Ms. Stewart's house. The bankruptcy court subsequently found that Wells Fargo's mortgage claims exhibited systematic errors arising from its highly automated, computerized loan-administration program and issued an injunction requiring Wells Fargo to audit every proof of claim it had filed on or filed after April 13, 2007; to provide a complete loan history on every account and file that history with the appropriate court; and "to amend...proofs of claim already on file to comply with the principles established in this case and [In re] Jones." Wells Fargo appealed, challenging the claim amount and the injunction. The court vacated the injunction as exceeding the reach of the bankruptcy court. Because neither the injunction nor the calculation of Ms. Stewart's debt was properly before the court, the court dismissed as moot Wells Fargo's appeal of legal rulings underlying the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the mortgage.

Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc. (TWD) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and filed its disclosure statement and plan, which eliminated all of TWD's shareholders' stock interests in TWD. Central to this dispute were the terms of the plan and statement; namely, whether the terms preserved TWD's claims against Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC et al. A few months after confirmation of the plan, TWD sued 32 of its former shareholders, including appellants here, for pre-petition dividend payments that were allegedly fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. 544, 548, and 550, and the Texas Business and Commerce Code, alleging that the former shareholders had received dividends and other transfers equaling millions of dollars while TWD was insolvent (Avoidance Actions). Laguna subsequently appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The court held that the bankruptcy court properly denied Laguna's motion for summary judgment because the plan adequately preserved the Avoidance Actions and the claims were not barred by judicial estoppel or res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.