Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her former employer, University Healthcare System, L.C. (UHS), for sex discrimination, retaliation, breach of oral contract, violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), and violation of the Louisiana Wage Payment Statute (LWPS), La. Rev. Stat. Ann 23:631. Both parties raised challenges on appeal relating to either the admission or discoverability of evidence. The court reversed the district court's award in favor of plaintiff under the LWPS and vacated the judgment as to that claim where there was no evidence of any completed oral contract to pay plaintiff the bonus and the jury's conclusion that such an obligation existed could not be justified based on the record. The court also reversed the award of attorney's fees related to the LWPS claim to plaintiff and vacated the judgment as to the amount of fees rewarded. The court further held that, in all other respects, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the amount of attorney's fees attributable to plaintiff's EPA claim. Plaintiff's trial counsel's motion for leave to assert privilege for attorneys' fees and costs on judgment was denied without prejudice to asserting the rights claimed therein by other means.

Defendant was granted a certificate of appealability of her habeas petition where defendant was convicted in state court of second-degree murder of her husband and sentenced to life imprisonment. At issue was whether the State withheld Brady material concerning a promise made to a co-defendant and whether the trial court unconstitutionally denied defendant an impartial jury in light of Ross v. Oklahoma. The court held that this case raised a reasonable probability that disclosure of the agreement between the prosecution and the co-defendant would have produced a different result and the state court's determination to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Therefore, based on the court's disposition of defendant's Brady claim, the court did not need to consider the merits of defendant's claim under Ross. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instruction to grant the writ under whatever conditions the district court may set.

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with an intent to distribute controlled substances and conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, including cocaine base (crack cocaine), and two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for modification of his life sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), relying on a recent amendment to the sentencing guidelines for crimes related to the possession and distribution of crack cocaine. The court held that, because the district court that sentenced defendant found that defendant was responsible for 32.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, an amount far in excess of the quantity that triggered the highest offense level under the current sentencing guidelines, the district court's denial of defendant's motion for modification of his life sentence was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed, inter alia, the magistrate judge's electronic order dismissing his case against defendant where plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant after plaintiff underwent emergency surgery after his colonoscopy. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal. The court held that the record contained no evidence that plaintiff consented to having his case disposed of by a magistrate and that the district court had not entered an appealable judgment or order. Therefore, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the suit and dismissed plaintiff's appeal. The court noted, however, that the district did have an obligation to issue a written, paper order when it disposed of a case.

Plaintiffs in this putative class action were buyers and processors of farm-raised crawfish who sought to recover their economic loss from a pesticide manufacturer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, (LPLA), La. Rev. State. Ann. 9:2800.54. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the manufacturer because plaintiffs' economic loss was unaccompanied by damage to their own person or property. The court held that, although plaintiffs have submitted evidence suggesting that they worked closely with crawfish farmers, plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence suggesting that the pesticide actually harmed their crawfish. The court also held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs were deprived of an actual, legal right to buy crawfish from the crawfish farmers. The court further denied plaintiffs' request to certify their proposed question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order of summary judgment.

This appeal concerned the disposition of unclaimed funds from a class action settlement where plaintiffs and defendants settled the underlying antitrust claims and where funds from the settlement were allocated to various identified members of the plaintiff class. At issue was whether the district court was permitted to dispose of the unclaimed funds via cy pres, regardless of the terms of the State's unclaimed property statutes. The court held that the unclaimed funds allocated to Texas plaintiffs were subject to the Unclaimed Property Act (Act), Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 72.001-74.710, that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) was not so broad as to preclude application of the Act, that the question of who had a right to the unclaimed funds was substantive in nature, and that the Act controlled. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed and vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and a single count of indecency with a child for sexually molesting his daughter. The state contended that the district court erred by concluding that it was not constrained by 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2) and could conduct an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual basis of petitioner's claim. The state also alleged that the district court erred by relying on evidence from that hearing to conclude that petitioner's trial counsel had violated his constitutional right to effective representation of counsel. The court held that the district court erred in conducting an evidentiary hearing and by relying on evidence from that hearing in light of Cullen v. Pinholster. The court also held that the district court erred in granting the federal habeas petition where counsel adopted reasonable trial strategies and had not acted deficiently under Strickland v. Washington. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court and denied petitioner's petition.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana. Defendant argued that the prosecutor improperly bolstered or vouched for the testimony of two Drug Enforcement Agency agents during the Government's direct examination of the agents and the Government's rebuttal closing argument. Defendant also argued that the district court committed plain error in allowing the examination and argument. The court held that the prosecutor's direct examination, considered in light of the context in which the examination was conducted, was not improper. The court held, however, that the prosecutor's rebuttal arguments were grossly improper and indistinguishable from similar arguments the court had found improper and the subject of repeated warnings. Therefore, the court held that the error was clear and obvious and, given the critical role of the credibility of the agents in the determination of defendant's guilt, the court found the error affected defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial.

This case involved a coverage dispute between St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul") and its insured where the insured wrote a recommendation letter for a former employee who later injured a patient. St. Paul appealed the district court's judgment, in which the court concluded that the commercial general liability policy issued by St. Paul covered the insured's claim for the damages he was required to pay in a misrepresentation lawsuit. The court held that there was no coverage under the policy for the amounts at issue and therefore, reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of St. Paul.

Defendant appealed his conviction of importing and possessing with intent to distribute fifty kilograms or more of marijuana. Defendant sought to assert a public authority defense at trial on the basis that he had been acting on the apparent authority of a local law enforcement officer to permit his conduct. The court held that the public authority defense required a law enforcement officer who engaged a defendant in a covert activity to possess actual, rather than only apparent authority to authorize the defendant's conduct. Therefore, because it was undisputed that the officer at issue lacked actual authority to authorize defendant's violation of the federal drug laws, the court held that the public authority defense was unavailable. Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed.