Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

New York Marine & General Insurance Company ("NYMAGIC") and Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ("NUFIC-PA") were both insuring Bayou Steel Corporation ("Bayou") when an employee of Bayou's Illinois stevedoring contractor, Kindra Marine Terminal ("Kindra"), was injured during Kindra's unloading of Bayou's steel bundles from a vessel belonging to Memco Barge Lines ("Memco"). Memco had contracted with Bayou to haul the cargo for Bayou by barge from Louisiana to Illinois. At issue was whether Kindra was Bayou's contractor or subcontractor for purposes of the provision in NYMAGIC's policy that excluded coverage of Bayou's liability for bodily injury incurred by employees of Bayou's subcontractors but did not exclude coverage of such injuries incurred by Bayou's contractors. The court held that, because Bayou was the principal party, paying party, and not the prime contractor, performance party, under both its barge transportation agreement with Memco and its offloading agreement with Kindra, there was no way for Kindra to have been a subcontractor of Bayou within the intendment of NYMAGIC's policy's exclusion of coverage. Kindra contracted directly with Bayou, not with some contractor of Bayou, to offload Bayou's cargo, so Kindra was Bayou's contractor. Accordingly, NYMAGIC's coverage exclusion did not apply to the employee's injuries because he was the employee of a contractor of Bayou.

Appellant, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a lawsuit against appellees asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), based in part on the allegations that he suffered from certain conditions during his incarceration and appellees failed to provide him with adequate medical care and prevented him from using the community work centers, accessing the satellite and regional prison facilities, working in the kitchen, and attending school. At issue was whether appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity for claims that they violated Title II of the ADA. As a preliminary issue, the court held that appellant had not alleged facts from which the court could reasonably infer that he suffered from a qualifying disability under the ADA and remanded the case to the district court in order to allow appellant to amend his Title II allegations where he had not had an opportunity to amend his claim after being alerted of its deficiencies.

Appellant challenged his sentence after conviction for conspiring to interfere with commerce by robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). At issue was whether the district court erred in applying United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2X1.1, covering conspiracies, in calculating appellant's Guidelines range. The court affirmed the sentence and held that the trial court did not err in applying section 2X1.1 where it applied to extortion conspiracies under the Hobbs Act in light of United States v. Villafranca.

Defendant was sentenced with a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. At issue was whether the district court's application of the enhancement was erroneous where defendant's prior 2006 robbery conviction was not a crime of violence. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant's 2006 robbery conviction qualified as a crime of violence and accordingly applied the sixteen-level sentencing enhancement where the district court was not in error in relying on the Government's proffer because defendant adopted the truth of the proffer of facts, which conceded that the facts in the plea agreement established that his conduct fell well within the generic definition of robbery.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief where he was convicted of capital murder. At issue was whether the prosecution violated petitioner's due process rights by impeaching his post-Miranda silence under Doyle v. Ohio. The court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Doyle in finding that the state's questions were permissible when, in viewing the cross-examination in its entirety, the state court's finding that the prosecutor's intent was to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement was not unreasonable and when the closing argument relied almost exclusively on petitioner's post-arrest behavior, noting that he failed to tell his mother or anyone else about the murder during the two days in which he was running from the police.

Plaintiff sued defendant under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.51-.59, for his injuries that resulted from his firing a Remington Model 710 rifle ("rifle"). At issue was whether the district court erred in its findings regarding the bolt-assembly pin and its "reasonably-anticipated-use" finding. The court applied a highly deferential standard and held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that the bolt-assembly pin was not in the rifle when plaintiff fired it and suffered injuries from the uncontained explosion. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that defendant should not have expected the rifle to be fired after someone had removed, but failed to install, the bolt-assembly pin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff filed an original petition in Texas state court alleging violations of federal law under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, violations of Texas state law under the Texas whistleblower statute, and common law defamation. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to remand the case to Texas state court after all federal claims had been deleted and only Texas state law claims remained. The court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to remand where the balance of the statutory and common law factors weighed heavily in favor of remanding the pendent Texas state law claims and where Carnegie Univ. v. Cohill did not permit the court to turn any allegation of improper forum manipulation into a trump card which could defeat the heavy balance of the other relevant considerations. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on each Texas state law claim, reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand, and remanded the case with instructions to the district court to remand the Texas state law claims to the Texas state court from which the case was removed.

Defendant, the former leader of the Gulf Cartel, a notorious Mexican drug cartel, was arrested in Mexico in 2003 and the United States took custody of defendant in 2007. At issue was whether the press and public have a First Amendment right to access sentencing proceedings, and if so, whether they are also entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to closure of sentencing proceedings. The court held that, as a preliminary matter, the court had jurisdiction over the case because it fell within the exception to mootness for issues that were capable of repetition yet evading review; that the press and the public have a First Amendment right of access to a sentencing proceeding; and that the district court deprived the intervenor plaintiff of its First Amendment right of access without due process in refusing to give the press and public notice and an opportunity to be heard before closing the sentencing proceeding. Therefore, because the sentencing already occurred, the court reversed the district court's orders denying the intervenor plaintiff's requests for notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as the district court's order denying the intervenor plaintiff's motion to open the sentencing proceeding.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for capital murder where he was under a sentence of life imprisonment for a previous murder and had been on parole for approximately eleven months when he committed the capital murder. At issue was whether the court should grant petitioner a certificate of appealability ("COA") authorizing him to appeal the denial of his habeas relief regarding his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and sentencing phases of trial and his claim that he was mentally retarded and entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that issue. The court denied petitioner's request for a COA where the district court's decision denying relief on these claims was not debatable among reasonable jurists and petitioner's claims were not adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, Wayne Hagan and James Joubert, alleging that Joubert was negligently excavating on a backhoe and severed plaintiff's underground fiber-optic cable in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN 40:1749,11 et seq., and that Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. At issue was whether the district court erred when it refused to give the jury plaintiff's proposed instruction on trespass. Also at issue was whether the district court erred when it excluded statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employee under Federal Rule of Evidence 408; when it refused to certify plaintiff's witness as an expert; and when it held that defendants were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The court certified the first issue where the Louisiana Supreme Court had not previously determined what standard of intent was used for trespass to underground utility cables and the issue was determinative of whether plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on its trespass claim. The court held that the statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employer could have been excluded on other grounds given that it was inadmissible hearsay against Joubert and therefore, the court declined to remand for a new trial on this ground. The court also held that the district court did not commit a reversible error where plaintiff did not proffer the substance of plaintiff's witness' excluded testimony. Finally, the court deferred addressing the attorneys' fees issue pending the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision on the first issue.