Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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An elementary school student with autism, intellectual disability, and a speech impediment exhibited severe behavioral issues, including frequent elopement from school and toileting problems, which impeded his academic and social development. The student communicated primarily through gestures and a specialized iPad, and his academic performance lagged significantly behind grade level. The school district developed an individualized education program (IEP) that included special classes, therapy, and behavioral interventions. While the IEP initially included a limited extended-school-year (ESY) program to combat regression over breaks, the student continued to regress, particularly after school vacations, resulting in dangerous incidents and increasing parental concern.After disagreements arose regarding the adequacy of summer ESY services, the student’s parent requested a due process hearing, seeking more robust ESY support and additional accommodations. The hearing officer found that the school district had failed to provide a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), ordering full-summer ESY services and year-round access to a communication device. The school district appealed the decision to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, which upheld the hearing officer’s findings, determining that the IEP was not sufficiently individualized and did not adequately address the student’s behavioral regression.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in finding the IEP deficient under IDEA standards. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the IEP was insufficiently individualized given the student’s severe behavioral regression and that the educational benefits provided—while academically positive—were outweighed by the failure to address nonacademic, safety-critical needs. The court concluded that the school district’s refusal to provide more effective ESY services denied the student an IDEA-appropriate education. View "North East Independent School District v. I.M." on Justia Law

Posted in: Education Law
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Kevin LaMarcus Mitchell, who has a history of criminal conduct, was previously convicted of being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a felony offense. Years later, during the execution of an unrelated arrest warrant, law enforcement found firearms in the room he occupied and Mitchell admitted to daily marijuana use. Based on his prior § 922(g)(3) conviction, Mitchell was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).After his indictment, Mitchell moved to dismiss the charge on several constitutional grounds, including an as-applied Second Amendment challenge in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. The district court denied his motion, after which Mitchell entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue. He was sentenced to sixty-four months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that, under Bruen and its own precedent, the Second Amendment’s plain text covers Mitchell’s conduct and that the only relevant predicate offense for an as-applied challenge is his prior § 922(g)(3) conviction. The court found that the government failed to identify a historical tradition justifying permanent disarmament of individuals with a predicate offense based solely on habitual marijuana use, in the absence of evidence of active intoxication while possessing a firearm. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Mitchell’s predicate offense, reversed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, and vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

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Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), an American technology services provider, licensed two insurance software platforms, Vantage and CyberLife, to Transamerica, an insurance company. Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), a technology consulting firm, was later engaged by Transamerica as a third-party consultant to maintain CSC’s platforms. CSC and Transamerica signed a Third-Party Addendum allowing TCS access to CSC’s software “solely for the benefit” of Transamerica. During this period, TCS sought to develop its own insurance platform, BaNCS, and won a $2.6 billion contract to transition Transamerica’s business to BaNCS. Evidence arose that TCS used CSC’s confidential information, including source code and technical manuals, for its BaNCS development, prompting CSC to allege trade secret misappropriation when a CSC employee discovered TCS sharing proprietary materials internally.CSC sued TCS in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). After an eight-day trial with an advisory jury, the jury found in favor of CSC, recommending substantial damages. The district court found TCS liable, awarding CSC $56 million in compensatory damages (based on unjust enrichment), $112 million in exemplary damages, and imposing a permanent injunction barring TCS’s use of CSC’s trade secrets and BaNCS versions developed with misappropriated material.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that TCS’s use was unauthorized under the relevant contracts and that TCS had the requisite mens rea, including willful and malicious misappropriation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the damages awards and the exemplary damages ratio. However, the court vacated the injunction in part, remanding for the district court to revise it: the injunction’s prohibition on TCS’s future use of BaNCS material developed post-misappropriation was found duplicative of the damages, and the definition of parties bound by the injunction was ordered to be clarified in line with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2). View "Computer Sciences v. Tata Consultancy" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs in this case are entities that own and operate a four-story building in Kemah, Texas. The building houses a bar, residential rental units, and a food truck. The dispute began when, in July 2021, the city issued a zero-occupancy notice for the building after an inspection found multiple safety hazards, prohibiting anyone except the owner and repair contractors from entering. Plaintiffs allege this deprived them of almost all economic use of the property. Separately, the city took enforcement action against the food truck, culminating in its removal from the property in October 2021. Plaintiffs challenged the food truck towing in state court, but ultimately dropped their appeal. They then sued the city in federal court, raising federal and state takings, due process, and equal protection claims regarding both the zero-occupancy notice and the food truck towing, and sought declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the city’s motion to dismiss. The court found the claims related to the zero-occupancy notice were not ripe because plaintiffs had not pursued available administrative appeals to the city council, as allegedly required by city ordinances. The court dismissed the food truck claims on the merits, and dismissed the request for declaratory relief because no substantive claims remained.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the zero-occupancy notice claims as unripe. The appellate court determined that the city’s issuance of the zero-occupancy notice constituted a sufficiently final decision for purposes of ripeness and that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reversed the dismissal of the zero-occupancy notice claims and remanded those claims, including the related request for declaratory relief, for further proceedings. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had waived their food truck claims by failing to adequately brief them on appeal and affirmed their dismissal. View "T&W Holding v. City of Kemah, Texas" on Justia Law

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A patient received treatment for diabetes at VA facilities from 2016 to 2022. In early 2020, he reported worsening symptoms and expressed dissatisfaction with his medical care, believing negligence contributed to his condition. Two years later, he filed a complaint with the Office of the Inspector General, alleging improper diagnosis and treatment at VA facilities. He also submitted a Standard Form-95 (SF-95) to the Office of the General Counsel, naming himself as claimant and his wife as a witness and property owner. The agency denied his claim, and he was informed of his right to sue. The couple then filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligent medical care caused kidney disease. Subsequently, the wife filed her own SF-95, asserting power of attorney, but the agency denied this claim as duplicative and because the couple had already sought judicial remedy.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the wife’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissed both plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred, and denied leave to amend as futile. The plaintiffs objected, but the district court adopted the recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court erred in finding the wife failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her property damage claim, because the administrative filing gave sufficient notice for that claim. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the alternative ground that all claims were barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations, as the plaintiffs’ injuries and property damages were or should have been known more than two years before the administrative claims were filed. The denial of leave to amend was also affirmed. View "Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas Department of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law

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A Jamaican citizen, admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) for influencing a federal official by threat and sentenced to 41 months in prison. Following this conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, alleging that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under immigration law, making him both removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. The individual contested these assertions, claiming his conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony.An immigration judge determined that the conviction was indeed for an aggravated felony, thus rendering the individual removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, applying the categorical approach without distinguishing which statutory alternative formed the basis for the conviction. The petitioner then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the petitioner’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) constituted an aggravated felony, specifically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). The court found the statute divisible and determined from the record that the conviction was for threatening to assault a federal official. The court concluded that this offense necessarily involved the threatened use of physical force, meeting the definition of a crime of violence, and thus an aggravated felony. The court also found that any error by the BIA in method was harmless. As a result, the Fifth Circuit denied both the motion for appointment of counsel and the petition for review, affirming the final order of removal and ineligibility for cancellation of removal. View "McLean v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Mark Stanford, an incapacitated resident of a Mississippi nursing facility, suffered severe burns after starting a fire in his room. The Mississippi State Department of Health determined that the nursing center failed to adequately supervise Stanford and maintain a safe environment, citing the facility for violating federal regulations regarding the safety and supervision of residents. Stanford, through his conservator, brought a lawsuit alleging negligence and medical malpractice against the nursing facility and related entities.Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed in 2017 by Stanford’s brother, Russell Phillips, who acted as Stanford’s health surrogate during his admission. Stanford opposed arbitration, arguing that the agreement was invalid because Phillips lacked authority under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act to bind Stanford, since Stanford’s adult son—a higher-priority family member under the statute—was reasonably available and willing to serve as surrogate. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that Phillips was not a proper surrogate under the statute and denied the motion to compel arbitration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to both the denial of arbitration and interpretation of state law. The Fifth Circuit determined that the key issue was whether, under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, a health care provider must ensure that no higher-priority family member is “reasonably available” before accepting decisions from a lower-priority family member acting as surrogate. Noting the statutory ambiguity and lack of controlling Mississippi precedents, the Fifth Circuit did not resolve the merits but instead certified this question of state law to the Mississippi Supreme Court for authoritative interpretation. View "Stanford v. Brandon Nursing" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Marcos Hernandez, has a documented history of violence against the mother of his child, Jessica Murillo, including multiple arrests and convictions for assault. His conduct escalated over several years, resulting in convictions for misdemeanor and felony assault of a family member under Texas law. In May 2023, Hernandez was found in possession of a short-barreled, unregistered 12-gauge shotgun while walking along a railroad track in El Paso, Texas. Subsequent investigation confirmed he had no firearms registered to his name. Hernandez was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of an unregistered firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Hernandez’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that both statutes violated the Second Amendment and, for one count, the Commerce Clause. Hernandez then pled guilty to both charges, admitting to his prior felony convictions and the facts surrounding the firearm. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release. Hernandez timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Hernandez’s constitutional challenges de novo. The court concluded that his facial Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by precedent. Regarding his as-applied Second Amendment challenges to both statutes, the Fifth Circuit held they fail because the Second Amendment does not protect possession of short-barreled shotguns and because Hernandez’s predicate offenses are crimes of violence. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, such convictions permit categorical disarmament. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Hernandez’s convictions. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

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Residents of Jackson, Mississippi, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the city knowingly contaminated their drinking water with lead, failed to treat the water to prevent lead leaching, and misled the public about the water’s safety. The complaint details how city officials ignored warnings about the water system’s vulnerabilities, failed to repair critical treatment equipment, switched water sources in a way that worsened contamination, and delayed notifying residents of dangerous lead levels. Plaintiffs claim they and their families suffered significant health effects, including lead poisoning and related medical and developmental issues, as a result of consuming the contaminated water.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process claim against the city and that the individual city officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity by claiming the city affirmatively introduced toxins into the water supply, misrepresented the water’s safety, and thereby deprived residents of the ability to make informed decisions about their health. The court also formally adopted the state-created danger doctrine as a viable theory in the circuit. The court reversed the dismissal of the due process claims against the city and vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims, remanding for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the individual city officials on qualified immunity grounds, finding the relevant rights were not clearly established at the time. View "Sterling v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

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In August 2019, a company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, with its only assets being three properties occupied by its sole member and two affiliates. Arrowhead Capital Finance, Ltd. obtained judgments against these affiliates and initiated an adversary proceeding against the debtor, seeking to hold it liable for the affiliates’ obligations. During this process, the bankruptcy trustee filed a separate adversary proceeding to recover unpaid rent from one affiliate. A settlement was reached in which Arrowhead received assignment of claims against the affiliates in exchange for releasing its own claims. The bankruptcy court approved this settlement, retaining jurisdiction over the assigned claims. Arrowhead then intervened and obtained a final judgment against the affiliates, including Royal Street Bistro, LLC (RSB).After the bankruptcy court entered judgment, RSB and another affiliate filed a notice of appeal but failed to attach a copy of the judgment as required by the bankruptcy rules. The bankruptcy court clerk issued a deficiency notice, and the corrected notice was filed ten days after the deadline. Arrowhead moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the failure to timely attach the judgment deprived the district court of jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed the appeal, holding that the defect was jurisdictional and, alternatively, that dismissal was warranted as a discretionary sanction for noncompliance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that failure to attach the judgment to the notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional defect under the bankruptcy rules, and that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the appeal without considering lesser sanctions or the absence of prejudice. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Royal Street Bistro v. Arrowhead Capital" on Justia Law