Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Arturo Mendoza created and uploaded fourteen images of morphed child pornography using Adobe Photoshop and cloud storage services. The images depicted adult sexual activity with the faces of two minor girls, ages twelve and six, photoshopped onto adult women’s bodies. Mendoza was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of transporting child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (b)(1). At sentencing, the presentence report recommended certain financial conditions related to restitution and a location-monitoring condition for supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted the presentence report and sentenced Mendoza to 120 months’ imprisonment, an above-Guidelines sentence, followed by ten years of supervised release. The district court left restitution open for ninety days but never entered an order for restitution, as no hearing was requested or held. The written judgment included special conditions: a location-monitoring requirement (with unclear duration and a home-detention component), and financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions. Mendoza appealed, challenging these supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred by imposing a home-detention component in the written judgment when only standalone location monitoring was pronounced orally, and by failing to specify the duration of the location-monitoring condition, violating due process. Additionally, the appellate court held that the financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions were imposed in error because restitution was never ordered and the record did not support these restrictions. The Fifth Circuit vacated all three challenged conditions and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, specifically for correction of the location-monitoring condition and for further proceedings regarding the financial conditions. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Corelle, a company that sold Instapot multifunction cookers, entered into a 2016 master supply agreement (MSA) with Midea, the manufacturer. Under this arrangement, individual purchase orders (POs) were used for each transaction, detailing specific terms such as price and quantity. Each PO typically included Corelle’s own terms, including indemnity provisions. In 2023, Corelle filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, as part of its reorganization plan, sold its appliances business and assigned the MSA to the buyer. However, Corelle sought to retain its indemnification rights for products purchased under completed POs made before the assignment.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Midea’s objection to this arrangement, finding that the POs were severable contracts distinct from the MSA. This meant the indemnification rights related to completed POs remained with Corelle. Midea appealed, contending that the MSA and all related POs formed a single, indivisible contract that should have been assigned in its entirety. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, emphasizing that the structure of the MSA and the parties’ course of dealing supported the divisibility of the POs from the MSA.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the standards applied by the lower courts, the interpretation of the contracts, and the application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(f). The appellate court held that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding the POs were divisible from the MSA, that Corelle’s retention of indemnification rights did not violate bankruptcy law, and that the lower courts applied the correct standards of review. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "GuangDong Midea v. Unsecured Creditors" on Justia Law

Police in Gautier, Mississippi, used an automatic license plate reader (LPR) system to identify a vehicle associated with Elijah Porter, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault. Officer Hoggard received an LPR alert, confirmed the vehicle’s connection to Porter through a computer check, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, Hoggard detained Porter and, while interacting with him, observed the barrel and slide of a firearm, as well as a silver automatic conversion switch, protruding from under the driver’s seat. The officer later retrieved the firearm—a Glock pistol equipped with a machinegun conversion switch—during an inventory search of the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Porter’s motions to suppress both the LPR-derived vehicle location data and the firearm, ruling that use of the LPR data did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the plain view and inevitable discovery doctrines applied to the firearm. The court also rejected Porter’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of a machinegun, was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Porter waived a jury trial and was found guilty in a bench trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that use of the LPR system to identify Porter’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements on public roads or in license plate information, and the LPR data was not as comprehensive as cell-site location data. The court further held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, and Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Porter’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o). The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

The defendant, employed as a daycare worker, took and distributed a sexually explicit photograph of an infant in her care. She pleaded guilty to one count of production and attempted production of child pornography under a plea agreement that included a waiver of her right to appeal, except in certain circumstances. At sentencing, the government advocated for the statutory maximum sentence and, in doing so, referenced the defendant’s sex as making her conduct more shocking and suggested that a lengthy sentence would prevent her from having children in the future. The district court ultimately imposed the statutory maximum sentence but did not mention the defendant’s sex as a reason for the sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas accepted the guilty plea and sentenced the defendant to 360 months in prison, 10 years of supervised release, and restitution. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments regarding her sex at the sentencing hearing. She appealed, arguing that the government’s statements violated her Fifth Amendment right to equal protection and that the appeal waiver in her plea agreement did not bar her appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the plain-error standard, as the defendant had not objected to the statements in the district court. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not rely on the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s sex when imposing sentence. Because the defendant could not show that the government’s statements affected her substantial rights or that a structural error had occurred, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no reversible error. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In this case, a witness in Laredo, Texas, reported hearing multiple gunshots fired from a black Cadillac SUV with a missing right rear taillight. Police responded, gathered shell casings, and located a gray Cadillac SRX matching the description, which had been previously stopped by police several days earlier with Jesus Eloy Garcia as one of the passengers. Based on the witness’s account, investigative findings, and past police encounters, law enforcement issued a “be-on-the-lookout” (BOLO) alert identifying the vehicle, its distinguishing features, and possible occupants. Later that day, officers located the Cadillac with three occupants, including Garcia, and conducted an investigatory stop. During the stop, Garcia was questioned, and bodycam footage was recorded.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Garcia’s motion to suppress the bodycam evidence, ruling that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Garcia subsequently pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. He argued on appeal that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the BOLO lacked the necessary specificity, so the evidence derived from the stop should be excluded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the BOLO contained sufficient detail, was based on multiple sources, and provided an adequate basis for the stop. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Garcia’s arguments and upholding the denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States after a felony conviction. His Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended two discretionary conditions of supervised release: that he report to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upon release and, if allowed to return to the United States, report to probation within 72 hours, and that he seek proper work authorization from ICE before working. Neither the defendant nor the government objected to these conditions before or during sentencing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas conducted the sentencing. At the hearing, the court confirmed that both parties had reviewed the PSR and that no objections had been filed. The court specifically asked defense counsel if she had reviewed with the defendant the fact that no objections were made, and counsel confirmed this. The court then orally adopted the PSR and its appendix, which included the supervised-release conditions, and imposed the sentence. The written judgment reflected these conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the district court failed to adequately pronounce the conditions and did not properly verify, as required by United States v. Diggles and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), that he had reviewed the PSR with counsel. The appellate court found that the district court’s oral adoption of the PSR satisfied Diggles and that the record showed the defendant had ample opportunity to review the PSR with counsel. The court also determined that the verification requirement of Rule 32 was met and that there was no plain error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Villafana-Mondragon" on Justia Law

A group of former student-athletes filed suit against a university, alleging that between 2012 and 2015, they sustained serious hip injuries while participating on the university's women's rowing team. They claimed that the injuries were caused by deficient coaching, athletic training, and medical care, which they argued were influenced by systemic gender-based disparities. The athletes pursued claims under Title IX for gender discrimination and under Texas law for negligence. The university moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed with the university as to eight plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and finding their claims time-barred. For a ninth plaintiff, the district court partially granted and partially denied summary judgment, allowing some claims for compensatory damages to proceed. The plaintiffs appealed the ruling for the eight time-barred claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were indeed barred by the statute of limitations.Following summary judgment, the university sought to recover litigation costs as the prevailing party under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The district court found the university to be a prevailing party and awarded the majority of the costs requested, after reducing the amount. The plaintiffs appealed the cost award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the university was properly designated the prevailing party, that none of the factors in Pacheco v. Mineta weighed against awarding costs, and that the university had met its burden to show the necessity and amount of costs sought. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of costs. View "Clouse v. Southern Methodist University" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a building in Corpus Christi, Texas, with significant cultural and historical importance, particularly within the Black community. Over several years, the City’s Code Enforcement Division cited the property for structural deficiencies and ultimately recommended its demolition. Despite the plaintiff’s efforts to preserve the building for historic purposes, the Building Standards Board voted to recommend demolition at a hearing that the plaintiff and her counsel could not attend. After the City temporarily suspended the demolition order, it imposed conditions on the plaintiff to secure the property, which the City later deemed unmet. The City then gave the plaintiff 30 days to demolish the building or face further action.The plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court against the City and two City employees, alleging that selective enforcement of building codes violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause, asserting a “class of one” theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded a substantive constitutional violation and thus did not reach the question of municipal liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the claim against the City, as the plaintiff did not pursue claims against the individual defendants. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish a municipal policy, custom, or pattern of selective enforcement sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court found that a single cited instance of allegedly selective enforcement was insufficient to plead an official policy or custom. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. View "Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi" on Justia Law

The defendant entered a bank in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and gave a cashier a note demanding money and threatening harm to everyone present. Believing he was armed, the cashier complied, handing over approximately $20,000. The defendant was later arrested and pled guilty to bank robbery under federal law. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended a career-offender sentencing enhancement based on two prior Louisiana convictions: one for armed robbery and another for attempted armed robbery.At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana agreed with the presentence report's assessment and found that the defendant qualified as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a). As a result, the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category were increased, resulting in a recommended guideline range of 151 to 188 months. The district court sentenced the defendant to 151 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The defendant objected, arguing that Louisiana armed robbery does not categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination de novo. The appellate court concluded that Louisiana’s armed robbery statute requires the intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, and not merely reckless or negligent conduct. The court found that the defendant failed to show any realistic probability that Louisiana would apply its statute to unintentional acts. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana armed robbery constitutes a “crime of violence” under the force clause of the Sentencing Guidelines and affirmed the district court’s sentence. View "USA v. Lanaute" on Justia Law

Several landowners in South Texas leased mineral rights to a company that later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the company, responding to a collapse in oil prices during the COVID-19 pandemic, temporarily halted production on wells within the leased premises for about 40 days before resuming operations. The bankruptcy court subsequently confirmed the company’s reorganization plan, which included a set deadline for filing administrative expense claims.The landowners, asserting that the company’s temporary cessation of production had automatically terminated their leases under the leases’ terms and Texas law, filed a motion in bankruptcy court seeking administrative expense priority for damages related to alleged post-termination trespass. They also sought to have a state court adjudicate whether the leases had terminated and whether trespass damages were owed, arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction or should abstain from deciding these underlying state-law issues. The bankruptcy court determined that it had core jurisdiction to decide the administrative expense claim, which included resolving the validity of the underlying lease-termination and trespass claims. The court found that the temporary cessation did not terminate the leases, denied the administrative expense claim, and declined to abstain. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning jurisdiction, abstention, and the application of Texas law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the administrative expense claim, which necessarily included resolving the underlying state-law lease-termination and trespass issues. The Fifth Circuit further held that, under the express terms of the leases and Texas law, the temporary cessation of production did not result in automatic termination, as production was resumed well within the contractual 120-day period. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. View "Storey Minerals v. EP Energy E&P" on Justia Law